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Abstract: This Article advances the thesis that real options are not only ubiquitous in law, but 
also provide novel insights about legal decision making, doctrines and rules.  An introduction 
provides a brief a primer about financial options, real options, and real options in law.  Part I of 
this Article develops implications of the fact that every lawsuit contains a sequence of real 
options for the plaintiff to unilaterally abandon that lawsuit.  Part II of this Article appraises the 
limitations of game-theoretic analysis of the abandonment options embedded in litigation and 
some responses to such limitations. Part III of this Article illustrates how to apply real options 
analysis to provide insights over numerous legal areas, including the “calculus” of negligence 
and the Hand formula; collateral estoppel and res judicata; constitutional amendments; judicial 
minimalism; and marriage or divorce statutes.  A conclusion summarizes the insights of the 
novel real options approach to law advanced in this Article.  An appendix develops a general 
mathematical sequential real abandonment options game-theoretic model of (possibly, frivolous) 
litigation.  This analytical model demonstrates how the real abandonment option values in 
(possibly, frivolous) litigation determine a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
sequential credibility of (possibly, frivolous) litigation and derives Nash equilibrium settlement 
values.  
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Introduction
What do buying a house, having children, and recalling the governor of California have 
in common?  These three seemingly unrelated experiences all involve not only sequential 
decision making,1 but also exercising or preserving various options.  House hunting may involve 
looking over many houses that differ along numerous dimensions.2  These differences mean that 
it can be difficult for a buyer to compare houses in order to determine an optimal stopping rule 
for house shopping.3  Passing on a particular house preserves options to buy other houses, but 
risks losing an option to buy that particular house later.  Multiple potential buyers might express 
interest in a particular house and end up bidding against each other.  A bidding contest over a 
house means that each potential buyer has fewer negotiating options because she may feel she 
has to make her initial bid her best offer instead of engaging in a series of negotiating rounds.  
Deciding to bid on and then possibly losing bids over houses can become an emotionally 
difficult roller coaster.4  The purchase of a home is part of the American dream, but for most 
Americans, their home is or was their most expensive purchase (at least, until then).  Thus, most 
(at least, first-time) home buyers finance part of the price of their purchase by taking out a 
mortgage.  Virtually every home mortgage grants a homeowner the option to pay the mortgage 
off early without any penalties for prepayment.5
Whether and when to have children, as well as how many to have are various options that 
people have.  Before (and even after) a child is conceived, there are numerous options regarding 
1 See generally, ERIC V. DENARDO, DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING: MODELS AND APPLICATIONS 2-3 (Dover ed., 2003) 
(describing the ubiquitous nature of sequential decision making).
2 House Hunters (HGTV television broadcast, Thursdays 10 and 10:30) (depicting the actual house search 
experiences of various first-time home buyers).
3
 ROBERT H. FRANK, MICROECONOMICS AND BEHAVIOR 288 (5th ed. 2003) (explaining that experienced realtors 
often show their clients two nearly identical houses, but with one that is both in better condition and less expensive 
than the other in order to provide their clients with the opportunity to make an easy decision).
4
 MARY FRANCES LUCE ET AL., EMOTIONAL DECISIONS: TRADEOFF DIFICULTY AND COPING IN CONSUMER CHOICE 2-
9 (2001) (detailing emotional difficulties that consumers face in deciding among consumption alternatives). 
5
 15 U.S.C. § 1639(c)(1)(A) (2003).
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birth control.  Conception can be assisted by reproductive and genetic technologies.6  Once a 
child is conceived, there are many options regarding prenatal care, whether to carry the child to 
full term, and methods of delivery.  But, while a woman is pregnant, she does not have the option 
to become pregnant again until after her first pregnancy concludes.  In addition, there are 
numerous adoption options.7  After a child is born, parents have and feel they have fewer options 
in terms of alternative joint activities or purchases.  Finally, there are numerous child rearing 
options.  Of course, children have options to have their own children.
The October 7, 2003 recall election of California governor Gray Davis is the result of the 
California Constitution providing California voters with options to recall their elected officials.8
Some social observers and political commentators fear that California’s recall election sets a 
dangerous precedent because it can lead to voters exercising their options to hold recall elections 
of any elected officials who make unpopular decisions.9  As a result, elected officials may come 
to engage in perpetual campaigning and elections might degenerate into no more than contests  
of personality or popularity.  But, fifteen states, the District of Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin 
Islands already have laws that provide their voters with options to recall elected state officials, 
and thirty-six states have laws that provide their voters with options to recall various local 
officials.10  In fact, a Gallup Organization poll conducted in 1987 found that sixty-seven percent 
of a nation-wide sample of one thousand and nine people supported amending the United States 
Constitution to provide for the recall of members of Congress and fifty-five percent of that same 
6 See, e.g., Peter H. Huang, Herd Behavior in Designer Genes, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 639 (1999).
7 See, e.g., Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 
(1978).
8
 CA. CONST. art. II, §§ 13-18.
9 But see, Richard Thompson Ford, Love It: The Recall is Pure Democracy, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS Aug. 14, 
2003 (criticizing poor arguments against a recall of California’s Governor Gray Davis).
10
 THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 125-27, tbl. 
6.1 (1989). 
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sample supported a Constitutional amendment providing for the recall of the President.11  Only a 
third of those polled opposed the idea of recalling nationally elected officials.12
Another common feature of buying a house, having children, and recalling the governor 
of California is risk. In fact, virtually every legal (and for that matter, non-legal) decision 
involves an element of risk.  Attorneys, their clients, elected officials, judges, jurors, legislators, 
litigants, negotiators, regulators and voters face various risks, including those arising from 
appellate, contractual, electoral, financial, judicial, legislative, regulatory, statutory, and 
technological sources.  It is increasingly critical for such decision-makers to respond effectively 
to such risks. Just as omnipresent as risks are the methods by which individuals, organizations, 
and institutions can employ to cope or deal with risks, including diversifying, hedging, insuring, 
and learning.  In a sense, (payoff-relevant) information can be thought of as the reduction of risk 
or the negative of risk.
A particular method of handling risks is by utilizing options.  An option provides its 
holder with a right, as opposed to an obligation, to choose some action in the future.  The word 
option “comes from the medieval French and is derived from the Latin optio, optare, meaning to 
choose, to wish, to desire.”13  Options are valuable from a decision-theoretic perspective when 
there are yet unresolved risks because they provide the flexibility to be not locked into an 
irreversible course of action.  In other words, options have no value if there is no risk & 
decisions are reversible.14  After all, risks involve not only dangers, but also opportunities.15
Options allow those facing risky environments to profit from the upside potential of, while 
truncating losses from the downside possibility of, the risks they face.  Options thus offer 
11 Id. at 132, tbl. 6.2.
12 Id. at 133, tbl. 6.2.
13
 MARION A. BRACH, REAL OPTIONS IN PRACTICE 1 (2003).
14
 ALEXANDER VOLLERT, A STOCHASTIC CONTROL FRAMEWORK FOR REAL OPTIONS IN STRATEGIC VALUATION 7-8 
(2003).
15
 The Chinese character for crisis is composed of two ideograms, namely those for danger and opportunity.
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asymmetric, kinked, or non-linear payoffs because options permit actors to make future decisions 
after learning relevant information concerning the risks they face.  
This Article’s major contribution is to develop the legal and policy implications of 
realizing that many legal doctrines and rules essentially regulate the numerous options that legal 
interactions provide.  The first and second parts of this Article focus on the options that plaintiffs 
have to abandon lawsuits.  In particular, part I and the appendix of this Article present a new 
theory of (possibly, frivolous) litigation.16 The following hypothetical example of medical 
malpractice litigation illustrates the value of a plaintiff’s option to abandon or drop litigation.  
Suppose that Portia sues her doctor, Daphne, for medical malpractice alleging negligence during 
a routine operation.  Daphne knows that she did nothing improper during the surgical procedure.  
But, Portia was under anesthesia during surgery and feels that someone must be to blame for her 
suffering.  Suppose that Portia’s ex ante or initial expected probability of her prevailing at trial is 
1/2.  Suppose that the monetary judgment which Portia initially expects to win at trial is 
$1,000,000.  Then, Portia’s initial expected judgment at trial is (1/2)($1,000,000) or $500,000.  
Suppose that Portia's total expected litigation costs for proceeding to a trial are $550,000.  
Portia’s lawsuit has a net expected value of $500,000-$550,000 = -$50,000 < 0.  
But, now suppose the lawsuit consists of two stages: discovery and trial, each of which 
costs Portia $275,000.  Also, suppose that discovery resolves all of the risks of Portia’s litigation; 
so that, the posterior or ex post probability conditional upon discovery of Portia's prevailing in 
court is either 0 or 1.  Portia would only proceed when she has a sure winner, and Portia would 
abandon a sure loser.  Portia's revised initial expected value or her initial option value of the 
lawsuit is thus (1/2)($1,000,000-$275,000)-$275,000 = (1/2)($725,000)-$275,000 = $362,500-
275,000 = $87,500 > 0.  Notice that holding fixed the other values of the parameters in this 
hypothetical, as long as the monetary judgment from prevailing in court for Portia exceeds 
16
 This novel theory was originally developed and introduced in Peter H. Huang, Litigation Options in Civil 
Procedure (1997) (unpublished J.D. thesis, Stanford University) (on file with the author) and reproduced in Joseph 
A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, Real Options and the Economic Analysis of Litigation: A Preliminary Inquiry, 
Stanford Law School Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 131 (May 1996).
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$825,000, this lawsuit has initial positive option value.  Portia would initially file this Negative 
Expected Value (NEV) lawsuit, but after discovery Portia would choose to drop this lawsuit once 
Portia realizes that Daphne is not liable for Portia’s misfortune.  The appendix of this Article 
derives and solves a multi-period game-theoretic model of litigation that generalizes this 
hypothetical by incorporating not only litigation abandonment options, but also bilateral 
settlement bargaining.
A few legal scholars have already begun to apply options analysis to study legal rules and 
institutions.17  But, financial economists and management scholars have been studying options 
theory and its applications in the practice of financial engineering and management science for 
over a quarter of a century.18  Options are classified as financial or real.19  Financial options are 
17 See, e.g., Peter H. Huang, A New Options Theory for Risk Multipliers of Attorney’s Fees in Federal Civil Rights 
Litigation, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1943 (1998); Peter H. Huang, Teaching Corporate Law From An Option Perspective, 
34 GA. L. REV. 571 (2000); Mark Klock, Is It “the Will of the People” or a Broken Arrow? Collective Preferences, 
Out-of-the-Money Options, Bush v. Gore, and Arguments for Quashing Post-Balloting Litigation Absent Specific 
Allegations of Fraud, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (2002); Michael S. Knoll, Put-Call Parity and the Law, 24 CARDOZO
L. REV. 61 (2002); Michael S. Knoll, Products Liability and Legal Leverage: The Perverse Effects of Stiff Penalties, 
45 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 99 (1997); Paul G. Mahoney, Contract Remedies and Options Pricing, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 
(1995); Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort Class Action, 115 HARV. L. REV.
749, 755-58 (2002); Klaus M. Schmidt, Contract Renegotiation and Options Contracts, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 432 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); and Alexander J. Triantis & George G. 
Triantis, Timing Problems in Contract Breach Decisions, 41 J. L. & ECON. 163 (1998).
18
 See generally Martha Amram & Nalin Kulatilaka, Disciplined Decisions: Aligning Strategy with the Financial 
Markets, 77 HARV. BUS. REV. 95 (1999); MARTHA AMRAM & NALIN KULATILAKA, REAL OPTIONS: MANAGING 
STRATEGIC INVESTMENT IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD (1999); F. Peter Boer, Valuation of Technology Using Real 
Options, July-Aug. RES. TECH. MGMT. 15 (2000); F. PETER BOER, THE REAL OPTIONS SOLUTION: FINDING TOTAL 
VALUE IN A HIGH-RISK  WORLD 26 (2002); BRACH, supra note 13; RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, 
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 268-76 (7th ed. 2003); RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, 
CAPITAL INVESTMENT AND VALUATION 429-49 (2003); Michael J. Brennan & Eduardo S. Schwartz, Evaluating 
Natural Resource Investments, 58 J. BUS. 135 (1985); PROJECT FLEXIBILITY, AGENCY, AND COMPETITION (Michael 
J. Brennan & Lenos Trigeorgis eds., 2000); DON M. CHANCE &  PAMELA P. PETERSON, REAL OPTIONS AND 
INVESTMENT VALUATION (2002); Andrew H. Chen et al., Valuing Flexible Manufacturing Facilities as Options, 38 
QUART. REV. ECON. & FIN. 651 (1998); Thomas E. Copeland & Philip T. Keenan, Making Real Options Real, 3 
MCKINSEY QUART. 128 (1998); TOM COPELAND & VLADIMIR ANTIKAROV, REAL OPTIONS: A PRACTITIONER’S 
GUIDE (2001); Peter Coy, Exploiting Uncertainty, BUS. WK. June 7, 1999, at 118; Avinash Dixit, Investment and 
Hysteresis, 6 AM. ECON. REV. 107 (1992); Avinash Dixit & Robert S. Pindyck, The Options Approach to Capital 
Investment, 73 HARV. BUS. REV. 105 (1995); AVINASH K. DIXIT & ROBERT S. PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY (1994); Keith J. Leslie & Max P. Michaels, The Real Power of Real Options, 3 MCKINSEY QUART. 4 
(1997); Timothy A. Luehrman, Investment Opportunities as Real Options: Getting Started on the Numbers, 76 
HARV. BUS. REV. 51 (1998); Timothy A. Luehrman, Strategy as a Portfolio of Real Options, 76 HARV. BUS. REV. 89 
(1998); DAVID G. LUENBERGER, INVESTMENT SCIENCE 337-43 (1998); Scott Mason & Robert C. Merton, The Role 
of Contingent Claims in Corporate Finance, in RECENT ADVANCES IN CORPORATE FINANCE (Edward Altman & 
Marti G. Subrahmanyam eds., 1985); Robert McDonald & Daniel Siegel,  The Value of Waiting to Invest, ? QUART. 
J. ECON. 707 (1986); Robert McDonald & Daniel Siegel, Investment and the Valuation of Firms when There is An 
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contracts that give their holders the right, but not an obligation, to buy (or sell) at a certain price 
on (or before) a certain date a particular quantity of some underlying financial asset.20 Examples 
of underlying financial instruments on which options are written include bonds, stocks, 
commodities (such as corn, soybeans, wheat, gold, or silver) futures contracts, foreign 
currencies, or stock indices.  There is a vast literature concerning the financial theory, 
institutional details, pricing models, regulation, and valuation of various financial options.21
Because options concepts, ideas, and terminology may not be familiar to some readers, 
this introduction offers a brief overview about options in general.22  A call option provides its 
owner with the right, but not obligation, to buy a specified quantity of some underlying item at 
some price called the strike or exercise price.  A put option provides its owner with the right, but 
not obligation, to sell a specified quantity of an underlying item at some price called the strike or 
exercise price.  An option’s price is called its premium to avoid confusion with exercise or strike 
prices.  A European option provides its owner with the right to exercise that option only on the 
Option to Shut Down, 26  INT’L. ECON. REV. 331 (1985); JONATHAN MUN, REAL OPTION ANALYSIS: TOOLS AND 
TECHNIQUES FOR VALUING  STRATEGIC INVESTMENTS AND DECISIONS (2002); Nancy A. Nichols, Scientific 
Management at Merck: An Interview with CFO Judy Lewent, 72 HARV. BUS. REV. 88 (1994); Robert S. Pindyck, 
Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Investment, 29 J. ECON. LIT. 1110 (1991); REAL OPTIONS AND INVESTMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY: CLASSICAL READINGS AND  RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS (Eduardo S. Schwartz & Lenos Trigeorgis eds., 
2001); Alex Triantis & Adam Borison, Real Options: State of the Practice, 14 J. APPL. CORP. FIN. 8 (2001); 
Alexander J. Triantis & James E. Hodder, Valuing Flexibility as a Complex Option, 45 J. FIN. 549 (1990); Lenos 
Trigeorgis, Real Options and Interactions with Financial Flexibility, 22 FIN. MGMT. 292 (1993); Lenos Trigeorgis & 
Scott P. Mason, Valuing Managerial Flexibility, 5 MIDLAND CORP. FIN. 14 (1987); REAL OPTIONS IN CAPITAL 
INVESTMENT – MODELS, STRATEGIES, AND APPLICATION (Lenos Trigeorgis ed., 1995); LENOS TRIGEORGIS, REAL
OPTIONS: MANAGERIAL FLEXIBILITY AND STRATEGY IN RESOURCE ALLOCATION 227-71 (1998); and W. Carl Kester, 
Today’s Options for Tomorrow’s Growth, 62 HARV. BUS. REV. 153 (1984).
19 BRACH, supra note 13, at 1.
20 See, e.g., WILLIAM L. MEGGINSON, CORPORATE FINANCE THEORY 226 (1997).
21
 For institutional details about financial options and their regulation, see generally Peter H. Huang, A Normative 
Analysis of New Financially Engineered Derivatives, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 471 (2000); Roberta Romano, A 
Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regulation, 55 MD. L. REV. 1, 41-47 (1996).  For the financial 
theory of and pricing models for stock options, see generally RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, 
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 561-615 (7th ed. 2003); RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, 
FINANCING AND RISK MANAGEMENT 181-208 (2003);  JOHN C. COX & MARK RUBINSTEIN, OPTION MARKETS
(1985); ESPEN GAARDER HAUG, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO OPTION PRICING FORMULAS (1998); PETER RITCHKEN, 
OPTIONS: THEORY, STRATEGY, AND APPLICATIONS (1987); and SHELDON M. ROSS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
MATHEMATICAL FINANCE: OPTIONS AND OTHER TOPICS (1999). 
22 See, e.g., Peter H. Huang, Teaching Corporate Law from an Option Perspective, 34 GA. L. REV. 571 (2000) 
(providing a more detailed introduction about options).  See also, JOHN D. AYER, GUIDE TO FINANCE FOR LAWYERS
325-248 (2001)
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date it expires.  An American option provides its owner with the right to exercise that option 
anytime before an including the date it expires.  So, an American option provides it owner with 
all that a European option does and more.  An option is at-the-money if the current price of the 
item equals the strike price.  A call option is out-of-the-money (respectively, in-the-money) if the 
current price of the underlying item that the option is written on is less (respectively, greater) 
than its exercise price.  Similarly, a put option is out-of-the-money (respectively, in-the-money) 
if the current price of the underlying item the option is written on is greater (respectively, less) 
than its exercise price.  
The intrinsic value of a call (respectively, put) option is the difference between the 
current price of the underlying item that the option is written on and the strike price 
(respectively, the difference between the strike price and the current price of the underlying item 
that the option is written on).  Even an option that is currently out-of-the-money has a positive 
(although possibly, very small) value because of its time value.  The time value of an option will 
be positive (although possibly, very small) as long as the options has not yet expired because in 
the remaining time before its expiration, an option may finish in-the-money.  It is of course true 
symmetrically that an option may finish out-of-the-money.  But, because options do not require 
their owners to buy or sell the underlying items on which the options are written on, rational 
option holders will simply choose to not exercise options that are out-of-the-money.  The option 
feature or nature of an option explains why intuitively an option always has a value that is non-
negative, gross of the option premium.
Financial options permit decision-makers to hedge such financial types of risk as those 
arising from fluctuations in stock prices, interest rates, or currency rates.23  Financial options are 
a type of state-contingent securities.  Professor Kenneth J. Arrow, a recipient of the 1972 Nobel 
Prize in Economics, introduced the concept and theory of state-contingent securities in a paper 
23 See generally, Peter H. Huang, Securities Price Risks and Financial Derivative Markets, 21 NW. INT’L. L. & BUS. 
589 (2001).
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that he presented in 1952.24  Many of today’s exotic financial derivatives that Wall Street 
investment banks create, such as catastrophe bonds (whose payoffs are linked to such natural 
disasters as earthquakes and hurricanes) utilize Professor Arrow’s work.25  Professor Robert J. 
Shiller has proposed the creation of even more contingent securities markets to hedge aggregate 
income risks, home price risks, income distribution inequality risks, intergenerational risks, 
international risks, and livelihood risks.26  Professor Stephen A. Ross proved that under certain 
assumptions, trading simple financial call and put options written on a single index of existing 
securities can realize any possible desired pattern of payoffs across contingencies and over 
time.27
Financial options have revolutionized modern financial markets by facilitating the 
reallocation of underlying financial market risks.  The 1997 Nobel Prize in Economics 
recognized the path-breaking financial option pricing models of Professors Fisher Black, Robert 
C. Merton, and Myron S. Scholes.28  Widely publicized huge losses from trading in financial 
options by such well-known corporations as Barrings Bank, Dell Computer, Gibson Greetings, 
and Procter & Gamble;29 such municipalities as Orange County, California;30 and such hedge 
24
 HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 219-20 (6th ed 2003).
25
 Kenneth Joseph Arrow, Le Role des Valeurs Boursieres Pour la Repartition la Meillure des Risques, 40 
ECONOMETRIE COLLOQUES INTERNATIONAUX DU CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RESERCHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE 41 
(1953), translated in Kenneth Joseph Arrow,  The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Risk Bearing, 31 
REV. ECON. STUD. 91 (1964).
26
 ROBERT J. SHILLER, MACRO MARKETS:  CREATING INSTITUTIONS FOR MANAGING SOCIETY’S LARGEST ECONOMIC  
RISKS (1993) and  ROBERT J. SHILLER,  THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER: RISK IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2003).
27
 Stephen A. Ross, Options and Efficiency, 90 QUART. J. ECON. 75, 84-86 (1976).  See also, Fred Arditti & Kose 
John, Spanning the State Space with Options, 15 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1 (1980) and Kose John, 
Efficient Funds in a Financial Market with Options: A New Irrelevance Proposition, 36 51 J. FIN. 685 (1981) 
(extending and generalizing Ross’ theorem).  See also, Rolf W. Banz & Merton H. Miller, Prices for State-
Contingent Claims: Some Estimates and Applications, 51 J. BUS. 653 (1978) and Douglas T. Breeden & Robert H. 
Litzenberger, Prices of State-Contingent Claims Implicit in Option Prices, 51 J. BUS. 621 (1978) (applying Ross’ 
theorem). See generally, Huang, supra note 21, at 477 (explaining the financial engineering implications of Ross’ 
theorem).
28 See, e.g., Fischer Black & Myron S. Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON.
637 (1973) and Robert C. Merton, Theory of Rational Option Pricing, 4 BELL J. ECON. 141 (1973).  See also, AYER, 
supra note 22, at 369-80 (providing an exposition for law students of the Black-Merton-Scholes option model and 
its application to equity pricing) and Robert A. Jarrow, In Honor of the Nobel Laureates Robert C. Merton and 
Myron S. Scholes: A Partial Differential Equation That Changed the World, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 229 (1999) 
(explaining the many contributions and ramifications of Black-Merton-Scholes option pricing theory).
29
 Brandon Becker & Jennifer Yoon, Derivative Financial Losses, 21 J. CORP. L. 215 (1995).
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funds as Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM);31 illustrated the potential dangers from 
speculation in financial options.32  These spectacular debacles generated two major government 
studies examining such financial derivatives as financial options.33  Recently, many 
commentators have questioned whether incentive compensation in the form of executive stock 
options contributed to the series of corporate fraud and mismanagement scandals, and whether, 
and if so, how companies should expense their executive stock options.34
Real options involve decisions concerning activities whose risks have not been 
completely reduced to financial assets or financial commodities.35  Real options are so named to 
differentiate them from such financial options as well-known executive stock options.36  The 
phrase, real options, is utilized in corporate finance to refer to options that managers have in their 
investment projects, such as the option to abandon unprofitable projects;37 alter capacity, output 
levels, or scale of operations; break up, divide, or partition investment opportunities; defer before 
(further) investing; switch inputs, outputs, or production methods; and grow from a pilot 
project.38  Indeed, any dynamic investment opportunity presents a sequence of real options.39
For example, business deal making negotiations entail numerous real options.40
30
 PHILLIPE JORION, BIG BETS GONE BAD: DERIVATIVES AND BANKRUPTCY IN ORANGE COUNTY (1995).
31
 Franklin R. Edwards, Hedge Funds and the Collapse of Long-Term Capital Management, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 189 
(1999); ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT
(2000); and NICHOLAS DUNBAR, INVENTING MONEY: THE STORY OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT AND 
THE LEGENDS BEHIND IT (2000).
32
 Peter H. Huang et al., Derivatives on TV: A Tale of Two Derivatives Debacles in Prime-Time, 4 G REEN BAG 2d. 
257 (2001).
33
 Financial Derivatives: Market Overview and Supervisory Concerns, A Report prepared by the House Banking 
Committee Minority Staff, Nov. 1993 and Financial Derivatives: Actions Needed to Protect the System, U.S. 
General Accounting Office, May 18, 1994 
34 See, e.g., FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 
156-60 (2003).
35
 Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147 (1977) (coining the phrase “real 
options”).
36 See Don M. Chance, A Derivative Alternative as Executive Compensation, Mar./Apr. FIN. ANALYSTS J. 6 (1997) 
(questioning the ability of executive stock options, at least as they are typically granted, to align the interests of 
executives with those of shareholders) and RON S. DEMBO & ANDREW FREEMAN, THE RULES OF RISK: A GUIDE FOR 
INVESTORS, 207-22 (1998) (discussing the possibly unexpected and perverse incentive effects of utilizing stock 
options in employee compensation).
37
 AYER, supra note 22, at 359-67.
38 See generally, BRACH, supra note 13, at 67-103; BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 18, at 616-41; DIXIT & 
PINDYCK, supra note 18, at 6-25; and TRIGEORGIS, supra note 18, at 1-4, 9-20, and 121-50 (1996).
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In describing a generic decision-making setting, the phrase real option implies that 
options theory is applicable to analyzing the sequential choices that are inherent in such a 
dynamic and uncertain environment.  Real options have a fascinating history.41  Familiar (and 
perhaps, some unfamiliar) examples of real options include the options to: abandon, perhaps 
temporarily (i.e. mothball) a project;42 become delinquent in property tax payments;43 breach a 
contract and pay liquidated or expectation damages;44 build or develop real estate property 
versus delaying construction;45 continue with education;46 declare corporate or personal 
bankruptcy;47 delay a project;48 dissolve a business arrangement, marital or corporate union, 
merger, partnership, or any other form of on-going or steady relationship;49 drill, develop, or start 
production from oil wells;50 engage in venture capital start-up investing;51 exchange one asset for 
another;52 heat new construction with electricity, heating oil, or natural gas;53 lease airplanes, 
39 See, e.g., Frank T. Magiera & Robert A. McLean, Strategic Options in Capital Budgeting and Program Selection 
under Fee-For-Service and Managed Care, 21 HEALTH CARE MGMT. REV. 7 (1996) (explaining how to apply real 
options analysis to healthcare management).
40 See generally RICHARD RAZGAITIS, DEALMAKING USING REAL OPTIONS AND MONTE CARLO ANALYSIS (2003) 
(introducing a real options approach to valuing and negotiating business projects).
41 BRACH, supra note 13, at 13-15.
42
 Brennan & Schwartz, supra note 18; Stewart C. Myers & Saman Majd, Abandonment Value and Project Life, 4 
ADVANCES IN FUTURES AND OPTIONS RESEARCH 1 (1990).
43
 Brendan O’Flaherty, The Option Value of Tax Delinquency: Theory, 28 J. URBAN ECON. 287 (1990).
44
 Mahoney, supra  note 17.
45 See, e.g., Paul D. Childs et al., Mixed Uses and the Redevelopment Option, 24 REAL ESTATE ECON. 317 (1996); 
David Geltner, On the Use of the Financial Option Price Model to Value and Explain Vacant Urban Land, 17 AM.
REAL ESTATE & URBAN ECON. ASSOC. J. 142 (1989); Steven R. Grenadier, The Strategic Exercise of Options: 
Development Cascades and Overbuilding in Real Estate Markets, 51 J. FIN. 1653 (1996); and Sheridan Titman, 
Urban Land Prices under Uncertainty, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 505 (1985). 
46
 Uri Dothan & Joseph Williams, Education as an Option, 54 J. BUS. 117 (1981).
47
 Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making, 24 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 356, 358-66 
(2001). 
48
 Jonathan E. Ingersoll, Jr. & Stephen A. Ross, Waiting to Invest: Investment and Uncertainty, 65 J. BUS. 1 (1992) 
and Saman Majd & Robert S. Pindyck, Time to Buiild, Option Value, and Investment Decisions, 18 J. FIN. ECON. 
7(1987).
49
 Dixit, supra note 18, at 127 & n.13.
50 See, e.g., Jeff Strnad, Taxes and Nonrenewable Resources: The Impact on Exploration and Development 
(unpublished manuscript, July 1996) (analyzing the effects of tax laws on the last three options).
51
 Pascal Botteron & Jean-Francois Casanova, Start-ups Defined as Portfolios of Embedded Options, International 
Center for Financial Asset Management and Engineering Research Paper No. 85 (May 2003) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the author).
52
 William Margrabe, The Value of an Option to Exchange One Asset for Another, 33 J. FIN. 177 (1978).
53 BRACH, supra note 13, at 7-8.  See also, Nalin Kulatilaka, The Value of Flexibility: The Case for a Dual-Fuel 
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assets, copiers, power plants, real estate, satellites, trucks, or zoo animals;54 maintain academic 
employment under faculty tenure;55 make a movie from a script and follow-up sequels if the 
original movie is a box office success;56 purchase assets, items, or properties;57 threaten to 
employ fewer workers if a firm has a flexible production technology;58 throw away food 
obtained from an all-you-care-to-eat buffet or freely dispose of items generally; try predatory 
pricing or to leverage monopoly power in one market into monopoly power in another market;59
and utilize (export or import) quota licenses.60
Real options theory applies financial option pricing models to derive qualitative, if not 
(yet) quantitative, estimates of real option values.61  Continuous time quantitative option pricing 
models usually assume that the stochastic process of underlying asset price risks is represented 
by geometric Brownian motion with drift.62  While such a distributional assumption does not 
describe litigation generally, other discrete time quantitative option pricing models, such as the 
binomial or two state option pricing model, may approximately describe a particular lawsuit.63
More generally, qualitative as opposed to quantitative option valuation models apply to litigation 
Industrial Steam Boiler, 22 FIN. MGMT. 271 (1993) (explaining the value of an industrial facility which can be 
fueled by gas or oil).
54 See, e.g., Steven R. Grenadier, Valuing Lease Contracts: A Real-Options Approach, 38 J. FIN. ECON. 297 (1995) 
and Stephen E. Miller, Economics of Automobile Leasing: The Call Option Value, 29 J. CONSUMER AFFAIRS 199 
(1995).
55
 John G. McDonald, Faculty Tenure as a Put Option: An Economic Interpretation, 55 SOC. SCI. QUART. 362 
(1974).
56 ZIV BODIE & ROBERT C. MERTON, FINANCE 448-50 (2000).
57 See, e.g., John E. Stonier, What is an Aircraft Purchase Option Worth? Quantifying Asset Flexibility Created 
Through Manufacturer Lead-Time Reductions and Product Commonality, in HANDBOOK OF AIRLINE FINANCE 231 
(Gail F. Butler & Martin R. Keller eds., 1999).
58
 Nalin Kulatilaka & Stephen Gary Marks, The Strategic Value of Flexibility: Reducing the Ability to Compromise, 
78 AM. ECON. REV. 574 (1988).  
59 Peter H. Huang, Still Preying on Strategic Reputation Models of Predation, A Review of John R. Lott, Jr., Are 
Predatory Commitments Credible? Who Should the Courts Believe? 3 GREEN BAG 2D. 437, 442-43 (2000).
60
 James E. Anderson, Quotas as Options: Optimality and Quota License Pricing under Uncertainty, 23 J. INT’L. 
ECON. 21 (1987).
61 MEGGINSON, supra note 20, at 292 n.42 (1997).
62 See, e.g., J. MICHAEL STEELE, STOCHASTIC CALCULUS AND FINANCIAL APPLICATIONS 29-40 (2001) and LARS 
TYGE NIELSEN, PRICING AND HEDGING OF DERIVATIVE SECURITIES 13 (1999).
63
 AYER, supra note 22, at 349-58; COX & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 21, at 166-85; James Cox, Stephen A. Ross, & 
Mark Rubinstein, Option Pricing: A Simplified Approach, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 229 (1979) and Richard J. Rendleman & 
Brit J. Barter, Two-State Option Pricing, 34 J. FIN. 1093 (1979).
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abandonment options because qualitative option valuation models do not make any distributional 
assumptions regarding the stochastic process of underlying risks.64  Qualitative option valuation 
models provide upper and lower bounds for option values.65
The rest of this Article is organized as follows.  Part I of this Article introduces the 
options approach to litigation, including quite possibly, frivolous litigation.  This part of the 
Article explains that (possibly, frivolous) lawsuits will be filed and settled when their embedded 
abandonment option values exceed the costs of purchasing those litigation abandonment options.  
Part II of this Article addresses limitations of a real abandonment options game-theoretic model 
of litigation.66  In particular, there is reason to believe that people have cognitive limitations in 
their ability to reason backwards in sequential games.67  There is also empirical and experimental 
evidence that emotions affect how people make decisions.68 Finally, recent psychological 
experiments indicate that decision makers often overvalue options and over-invest in keeping 
options alive, even if those options present little intrinsic value.69  Part III of this Article 
demonstrates how and why a real options viewpoint alters the standard negligence “calculus” of 
tort law as captured by the Hand rule.  Finally, part III of this Article demonstrates that many 
laws and judicial doctrines effectively preclude specific real options in legal settings.  These 
include the collateral estoppel, res judicata, judicial minimalism, and family law statutes 
imposing conditions on marriage or divorce.
64 See, e.g., John C. Cox & Stephen A. Ross, A Survey of Some New Results in Financial Option Pricing Theory, 31 
J. FIN. 383, 384-89 (1987) (presenting option pricing results that are distribution and preference free).
65
 Merton, supra note 28, at 142-60 (deriving restrictions on option pricing formulae based upon the assumption that 
investors prefer more wealth to less wealth) and Hal R. Varian, The Arbitrage Principle in Financial Economics, J. 
ECON. PERSP. 55, 62-64 (1987) (deriving bounds for option prices based upon the no-arbitrage condition).
66 See also, VOLLERT, supra note 14, at 42-44 (discussing drawbacks to real options analysis in general).
67 See, e.g., Robert Rosenthal, Games of Perfect Information, Predatory Pricing and the Chain-Store Paradox, 25 J. 
ECON. THEORY 92 (1981).
68 See, e.g., Wilco W. van Dijk et al., Emotional Reactions to the Outcomes of Decisions: The Role of 
Counterfactual Thought in the Experience of Regret and Disappointment, 75 ORG. BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION 
PROCESSES 117 (1998).
69
 Jiwoong Shin & Dan Ariely, Keeping Doors Open: The Effect of Unavailability on Incentives to Keep Options 
Viable, presented at the Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics (July 31, 2003) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the author).
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I. (Possibly, Frivolous) Litigation Option Games
A litigation explosion is merely a descriptive phrase, devoid of any particular normative 
content.  Legal sociologist Professor Marc Galanter argued that an explosion in litigation is not 
only foreseeable, but also socially desirable.70 But, Walter Olson, a senior fellow of the 
Manhattan Institute, argued that an explosion in litigation is both man-made and socially 
undesirable.71  Although the quantity of litigation in the United States in comparison with other 
countries and over time has always been a subject of much debate and controversy, there is a 
more recent and related but more specific concern regarding the nature or quality of litigation in 
particular areas, including medical malpractice, product liability lawsuits, derivative shareholder 
lawsuits, so-called strike lawsuits, and nuisance lawsuits in general.72 Many legal and social 
commentators feel that America is and has been experiencing an explosion in frivolous litigation.  
An explosion in frivolous litigation is not normatively neutral.  A perceived rise in 
frivolous lawsuits alleging securities fraud was a major impetus for California’s Proposition 211 
and the provisions imposing strict pleading requirements contained in the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which Congress enacted over President Clinton’s veto.73  The 
politics of American litigation reform and specific anti-litigation campaigns is an interesting 
reflection of American culture, history, and society that is beyond the scope of this Article.74
Whether there has been such a frivolous litigation explosion is a descriptive and historical 
question, which is empirically challenging to resolve because nearly all lawsuits settle with many 
of the settlements often involving confidentiality agreements.  But, positive theoretical 
70
 Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 38 (1986).   
71
 WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT
(1991) and WALTER K. OLSON, THE RULE OF LAWYERS: HOW THE NEW LITIGATION ELITE THREATENS AMERICA’S 
RULE OF LAW (2003).
72 See, e.g., REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002).
73
 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995); the strict pleading requirements are codified at 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(b)(2).
74 See generally, THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER LITIGATION IN 
AMERICAN SOCIETY (2002).
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economics can provide insights to frivolous litigation by providing analytical, formal, rigorous, 
and systematic models.75  What procedural and/or substantive reforms would reduce frivolous 
litigation is a normative question, which raises difficult concerns involving procedural fairness, 
both outcome-based and process-based, in addition to questions regarding the nature and limits 
of substantive rights.  But, normative theoretical economics can help answer this question by 
identifying and comparing the various error and process costs of alternative reforms.76  The rest 
of this part of the Article first analyzes models of litigation in general and then analyzes models 
of frivolous litigation in particular.
A. Models of Litigation
The application of microeconomics to litigation has a distinguished and relatively long 
history in the field of law and economics.77  There also is a rich literature analyzing civil 
procedure utilizing microeconomics.78  Three path-breaking models set the standard for the 
formal economic analysis of the settlement of litigation.79  First, Professor William Landes 
explained why most criminal cases involve negotiated sentences instead of trial.80  Second, 
Professor Richard Posner explained why the FTC and other administrative agencies settle most 
regulatory disputes via out-of-court settlements.81  Third, Professor John Gould explained why 
75 See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Sanctioning Frivolous Suits, 82 GEO. L.J. 397, 426-35 
(1993) (providing a formal economic model of how optimally to sanction frivolous lawsuits).
76 See, e.g., ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 125-57 (2003).
77
 For excellent surveys of this literature, see Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 113; ROBERT D. COOTER & THOMAS 
S. ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS, 388-444 (4th ed. 2004); Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Settlement of Litigation, 
in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 442 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); and Steven 
Shavell, Basic Theory of Litigation, in FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (forthcoming, 2003).
78 See, e.g., John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Conference on Economic Analysis of Civil Procedure 23 
J. LEGAL STUD. 303 (1994) (providing a representative selection of such research).
79 THOMAS J. MICELI, ECONOMICS OF THE LAW: TORTS, CONTRACTS, PROPERTY, LITIGATION 156-80 (1997) 
(providing an excellent mathematical exposition of the economics of litigation and settlement).  See also, COOTER & 
ULEN, supra note 77, at 413-17 (providing a less technical exposition of an economic theory of settlement 
bargaining). 
80
 William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971).
81
 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 
399 (1973).
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most civil cases are settled before trial.82  The Landes-Posner-Gould (LPG) single-person 
decision theory expected value approach to settlement of litigation culminated in Professor 
Steven Shavell's model comparing the incentives to sue and settle under the American and 
British rules for allocating legal costs.83  Some legal practitioners utilize the powerful tools of 
single-person decision theory and risk analysis to help facilitate the settlement of their clients’ 
legal disputes.84
The standard approach in law and economics models to how people deal with risk is to 
assume that legal decision-makers maximize their expected utilities of wealth.  This general 
assumption is often then reduced to assuming that legal decision-makers maximize the net 
present discounted values of their expected wealth levels.   In other words, neoclassical models 
assume that legal decision-makers have as their utility function over wealth, the net present 
discounted value of wealth.  This can be more accurately termed an expected value of wealth 
approach to risk.    
An expected value approach to the risks in litigation is appropriate if legal decision-
makers in litigation were locked into their initial decisions.  What an expected value approach to 
risks ignores are the opportunities to make future choices after learning more concerning the 
payoff-relevant risks.  In the lawsuit context, an expected value approach neither incorporates, 
nor reflects the value of the flexibility provided by a plaintiff’s options to abandon litigation after 
learning unfavorable information regarding the legal merits of her case.  The values of the 
abandonment real options embedded within litigation lead to qualitatively different implications 
concerning the incentives to sue, settle, or go to trial than under the usual expected value 
approach to lawsuits and can be quite large quantitatively.
82
 John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973).
83
 Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation 
of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982).
84 See, e.g., David P. Hoffer, Decision Analysis as a Mediator’s Tool, 1 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 113 (1996); 
Marjorie C. Aaron, The Value of Decision Analysis in Mediation Practice, 11 NEGOTIATION J. 123-33 (1995); and 
Marc B. Victor, The Proper Use of Decision Analysis to Assist Litigation Strategy, 40 BUS. LAWYER 617 (1985).  
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Professor Bradford Cornell was the first scholar to observe that plaintiffs have options to 
drop a lawsuit before incurring the cost of a full blown trial.85  Professor Cornell showed the 
option to drop a lawsuit increases the expected payoff to a lawsuit and hence the incentive to file 
a lawsuit.  Professor Cornell's analysis extends the LPG model in which litigation decisions were 
based solely on the (present discounted) value of a lawsuit’s costs and expected benefits by 
introducing an explicit options approach to litigation.  William J. Blanton applied Cornell’s 
insights to evaluate the impact on a plaintiff’s incentive to file a lawsuit of changes in evidentiary 
rules.86  In particular, Blanton focuses on changes in the admissibility of expert scientific 
testimony resulting from the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.87 Blanton identified four principal ways in which any evidentiary, 
procedural, or substantive rule (or change in a rule) can reduce the value of a plaintiff’s option to 
unilaterally drop litigation, namely: 1) increasing plaintiff’s litigation costs; 2) front-loading 
plaintiff’s litigation costs; 3) enhancing trial precision; and 4) obfuscating plaintiff’s ability to 
predict a trial outcome.88  Frederick Dunbar, et al. provided an options-based approach to 
nuisance lawsuits; plaintiffs' attorneys' behavior under contingent fee arrangements in securities
litigation; securities litigation reform; and testable hypotheses about observed settlements in 
shareholder class actions.89
Professor Peter H. Huang introduced an options model of contingency multipliers for 
attorneys’ fees in public interest and civil rights litigation.90  Professor Steven Shavell raised a 
set of related concerns in his affidavit for a civil rights case where attorney’s fees were hotly 
85
 Bradford Cornell, The Incentive to Sue: An Option-Pricing Approach, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 173 (1990).
86
 William J. Blanton, Reducing the Value of Plaintiff’s Litigation Option in Federal Court: Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals,, Inc., 2 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 159 (1995).
87
 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
88
 Blanton, supra note 86, at 160-61; 182-90.
89
 Frederick C. Dunbar et al., Shareholder Litigation: Deterrent Value, Merits and Litigants' Options, John M. Olin 
School of Business, Washington University Working Paper 95-07-a 26-30 (1995).
90
 Peter H. Huang, A New Options Theory for Risk Multipliers of Attorney’s Fees in Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 
73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1943 (1998).
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contested.91  But, Professor Shavell did not frame his argument explicitly in terms of the 
language of a real options approach to litigation.  Also related are Professor Huang’s proposal to 
incorporate real options in (teaching) corporate law;92 and Professor Huang’s suggestion 
advocating a real options approach to understanding why a firm could rationally choose to 
engage in predatory pricing.93
Professor Lucian Bebchuk provided a theory of NEV lawsuits where threats to go to trial 
are credible due to divisibility over time of plaintiffs' litigation costs.94  The real options model 
of litigation in this Article differs from Professor Bebchuk's model because in his model litigants 
face certainty over expected trial outcomes and legal fees, while litigants in this Article’s model 
face uncertainty over expected judgments and/or litigation costs.  The plaintiffs in the model of 
this Article have opportunities to not only learn about expected judgments and/or litigation costs 
during the litigation process, but also to drop litigation conditional on information they learn 
during the course of that litigation.  The divisibility of legal costs also forms the basis for 
Professor William Landes' model of unitary versus sequential trials.95  Professor Landes 
demonstrated that bifurcating liability and damages reduces expected litigation costs (because 
there is no need to litigate damages if there is no liability), which in turn increases the incentives 
to sue and the minimum acceptable settlement as well as decreases the maximum settlement 
offer.
There is a vast literature about optimal sequential decision-making, both for single-person 
decision-makers playing against (probabilistic laws of) nature and for multi-person decision-
91
 Affadavit of Steven M. Shavell, In re Burlington Northern, Inc., Employment Practices Litigation, Nos. MDL 
374, 78 C269, 1985 WL 1808 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 1985).
92
 Huang, supra note 17, at 593-96 (2000).
93
 Huang, supra note 59.
94
 Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 
1 (1996).
95
 William M. Landes, Sequential Versus Unitary Trials: An Economic Analysis, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 99 (1993).  See 
also, DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 251-60 (1994) (extending Landes’ model to cases where 
litigants possess unverifiable information) and William M. Landes, Sequential and Bifurcated Trials, in 3 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 438 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (discussing the sequential 
nature of litigation).
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makers playing against each other in a so-called game.  A lawsuit is more accurately described 
by a multi-person decision-making environment or game than by a single-person decision-
making environment because of the interactive nature of litigation.  Scholars have applied multi-
person decision theory or game theory to analyze settlement negotiations in litigation.96  Game 
theory’s origins date back at least two thousand and five hundred years and can be found in 
classic Chinese philosophical texts.97  Multi-person decision theory, as it is more accurately 
described, is a branch of applied mathematics,98 having numerous applications in biology,99
economics,100 everyday life,101 management,102 and politics.103 It has become standard practice to 
apply game theory to analyze legal rules and institutions.104  The programs of the annual 
meetings of the American Law and Economics Association since its inception in 1991 document
how pervasive game-theoretic models have become in legal scholarship.  Additional proof of the 
acceptance of game-theoretic reasoning in the legal scholar's toolkit is found in the pages of the 
five law and economics journals.105  Finally, game theory played a crucial role in designing the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) auctions for assigning licenses to wavelengths for 
such personal communication services as cell phones and wireless computer access services.  
Professor John McMillan provides an excellent account of this case study in the success of 
modern game theory applied to policy.106  He explains how the features of the auction format the 
96 See, e.g., ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND
DISPUTES 106-26 (2000).
97 See, e.g., SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR (140 - 118 B.C).
98 See, e.g., HAROLD W. KUHN, LECTURES ON THE THEORY OF GAMES (2003).
99 See, e.g., JOHN MAYNARD SMITH, EVOLUTION AND THE THEORY OF GAMES (1982).
100 See, e.g., AVINASH DIXIT & SUSAN SKEATH, GAMES OF STRATEGY (1999).
101 See, e.g., AVINASH DIXIT & BARRY NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY: THE COMPETITIVE EDGE IN 
BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND EVERYDAY LIFE (1991).
102 See, e.g., JOHN MCMILLAN, GAMES, STRATEGIES, AND MANAGERS (1992).
103 See, e.g., JAMES D. MORROW, GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS (1994).
104 See, e.g., Peter H. Huang, Strategic Behavior and the Law: A Review of GAME THEORY AND THE LAW and A 
Guide to Game Theory for Legal Scholars, 36 JURIM. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 99 (1995) (providing a review of this book 
and an annotated tour of many other leading game theory texts).
105
 AM. L. ECON. REV., J.L. & ECON., J. LEGAL STUD., INT’L REV. L. & ECON., and J.L. ECON. & ORG.
106
 John McMillan, Selling Spectrum Rights, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 145 (1994).  See also, John McMillan, Market 
Design: The Policy Uses of Theory, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 139, 139-42 (2003) (discussing other successful 
applications of modern sophisticated game theory to the optimal design of economic policy).
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FCC essentially adopted were those that were proposed by Professors Preston McAfee, Paul R. 
Milgrom and Robert Wilson and experimentally tested by Professor Charles Plott.107  As 
Professor McMillan stated, "[w]hen the theorists met the policy-makers, concepts like Bayes-
Nash equilibrium, mechanism design, incentive-compatibility constraints, and order-statistic 
theorems came to be discussed in the corridors of power."108
B. Models of Frivolous Litigation
Both the positive and normative analysis of frivolous litigation depends on the definition 
of frivolous litigation.  Defining a frivolous lawsuit is more complicated than one might initially 
think.  Professor Robert Bone thoughtfully discusses the problems in defining frivolous 
litigation.109  An obvious definition of a frivolous lawsuit is a case in which the plaintiff does not 
expect initially to prevail at trial.  In other words, the plaintiff of a frivolous lawsuit suffered no 
legally recoverable damages because she either suffered no harm or if she did suffer harm, she 
cannot recover for them from the defendant, under existing legal precedent.  Her case lacks any 
legal merit because her expected judgment from proceeding to a trial is zero.  
A more inclusive approach to defining frivolous litigation includes cases involving a 
plaintiff lacking the credibility to go to trial. In other words, frivolous litigation can be defined as 
litigation where the expected judgment is greater than zero, but still remains less than the 
plaintiff’s costs of proceeding to trial.  Such negative expected value (NEV) litigation appears to 
be irrational for plaintiffs to file and for defendants to settle.  But, such a comprehensive 
107
 Paul R. Milgrom, Game Theory and the Spectrum Auctions, 42 EUR. ECON. REV. 771 (1998) and PAUL R. 
MILGROM, PUTTING AUCTION THEORY TO WORK (2003).
108 Id. at 146.  See generally DAVID M. KREPS, GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELLING (1987) (presenting a 
non-technical introduction to the strengths and weaknesses of non-cooperative (asymmetric information) game 
theory).  But see, Robert J. Aumann, What is Game Theory Trying to Accomplish?, in FRONTIERS OF ECONOMICS
(Kenneth J. Arrow & Seppo Honkapohja eds., 1987) (questioning whether the goal of game theory is or should be 
prediction); and ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, The Rhetoric of Game Theory, in ECONOMICS AND LANGUAGE 71-88 (2000) 
(doubting the practical applicability of game theory).
109 BONE, supra note 76, at 41-43 and Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 529-33 
(1997).
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definition of frivolous litigation as NEV litigation includes cases which seek to establish new 
legal theories that differ from existing legal precedent.  Many people, including the author of this 
Article, believe and feel that novel test cases in such legal areas as civil rights actions, e.g. 
subconscious gender discrimination or unconscious racial discrimination, should not be 
considered as frivolous litigation.  
Professor Bone decides to define a frivolous lawsuit as one for which a plaintiff either: 
(1) actually knows the case completely (or virtually completely) lacks any merit under the legal 
theories being alleged; or (2) fails to conduct a reasonable investigation before filing, where had 
a plaintiff conducted a reasonable investigation before filing, the lawsuit would have been 
frivolous under the first prong of this definition.110  This definition of frivolous litigation differs 
from negative expected value litigation, where the total costs of litigation exceed the expected 
value of judgment at trial.  As Professor Bone details, positive net expected value litigation 
explanations of frivolous litigation are unconvincing.111
A number of law and economics models address the dual questions of why plaintiffs file 
frivolous lawsuits and why defendants agree to settle frivolous lawsuits.112 Existing models 
demonstrate that frivolous litigation can be credible if litigants possess different probability 
estimates of the plaintiff prevailing at trial;113 courts make legal errors;114 parties’ litigation costs 
are incurred sequentially;115 asymmetries exist between litigants in the size or timing of litigation 
costs;116 plaintiffs have private information concerning their cases;117 or plaintiffs have the 
110 BONE, supra note 76, at 43 and Bone, supra note 109, at 533.
111 BONE, supra note 76, at 44- 45 and Bone, supra note 109, at 534-37.
112
 For excellent summaries of economic analyses of frivolous lawsuits, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, Suits with Negative 
Expected Value, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 551 (Peter Newman ed., 
1998); BONE, supra note 76, at 20-68; Bone, supra note 109, at 534-77; MICELI, supra note 79, at 181-200 (1997);
Eric B. Rasmusen, Nuisance Suits, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 690-93 
(Peter Newman ed., 1998); and Steven Shavell, Extensions of the Basic Theory of Litigation, in FOUNDATIONS OF 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (forthcoming 2003).   
113
 Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. 
ECON. LIT. 1067, 1083-84 (1989).   
114
 Keith N. Hylton, Costly Litigation and Legal Error Under Negligence, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 433, 441 (1990).   
115
 Bebchuk, supra note 94.
116
 David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT’L REV. 
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ability to (pre)commit to litigation, e.g. by having lawyers on retainer and paying for legal 
services in advance, whether or not plaintiffs undertake litigation to a trial.118
The questions of why a plaintiff would choose to file a frivolous lawsuit and why a 
defendant would agree to settle a frivolous lawsuit are troublesome both intellectually and 
practically.  Asymmetric information game-theoretic models answer both questions, but as the 
phrase asymmetric information suggests, these models assume that just one side of the litigation 
realizes the litigation is frivolous.119  In other words, either the plaintiff or the defendant knows 
her or his actual type (frivolous or non-frivolous plaintiff or defendant) and there is no credible 
mechanism for communication or truthful revelation of such private information besides 
litigation.  The 2001 Nobel Prize in Economics recognized the pioneering research and seminal 
concepts in the economics of asymmetric information due to Professors George Akerlof, Andrew 
Michael Spence, and Joseph E. Stiglitz.120  Such concepts as lemons, pooling, separation, and 
signaling games play crucial roles in asymmetric information game-theoretic models of frivolous 
litigation.121
This Article allows for the realistic possibility that initially neither side of the litigation 
knows whether they are part of a frivolous lawsuit or perhaps more importantly the possibility 
that initially neither side of the litigation knows for certain whether a court will hold they are part 
of a frivolous lawsuit.  For example, medical malpractice plaintiffs often file a lawsuit in part 
from a motivation to find out what really happened with a medical procedure that went awry.  
L. & ECON. 3 (1985).
117
 Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Litigation on the Settlement of Legal Disputes, 10 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 
(1990).   
118
 HERBERT GINTIS, GAME THEORY EVOLVING: A PROBLEM-CENTERED INTRODUCTION TO MODELING STRATEGIC 
INTERACTION 100-02 (2000).   
119 BONE, supra note 76, at 54 and Bone, supra note 109, at 542, 598-99.
120 See, e.g., George Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 
QUART. J. ECON. 488 (1970); A. Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 QUART. J. ECON. 355 (1973); and 
Michael Rothschild & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay in the Economics 
of Imperfect Information, 80 QUART. J. ECON. 629 (1976). 
121 BONE, supra note 76, at 59- 64 and Bone, supra note 109, at 552-66.
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Although doctors would indeed know whether they operated negligently, they may still be 
unsure as to whether an empathetic jury will nonetheless find in favor of a sympathetic plaintiff.
The model in the appendix of this Article captures litigation that is only possibly 
frivolous despite having negative initial expected value.  The adjective possibly reflects the 
realistic feature of litigation that during its course or process, litigants and their attorneys revise 
their expected values to and expected costs of proceeding to a trial.  In other words, parties and 
their lawyers will only learn if a lawsuit is frivolous after the lawsuit commences.  Frivolous 
litigation is not rational for plaintiffs to file and for defendants to settle if litigation costs are 
incurred up front, all-at-once or if the expected value of litigation does not change over the 
course of litigation.  But, possibly frivolous litigation can be rational for plaintiffs to file and for 
defendants to settle if litigation costs are incurred sequentially and if the expected value of 
litigation changes over the course of litigation.   
This Article develops a new theory of the conditions under which (possibly, frivolous) 
litigation is credible for plaintiffs to file and for defendants to settle.122  This novel theory of 
(possibly, frivolous) litigation is based upon two central features of litigation.  The first aspect of 
litigation is that once a plaintiff makes the initial decision to file a lawsuit, that plaintiff faces a 
sequence of additional decisions about whether to drop that lawsuit.  State and federal rules of 
civil procedure provide parties to a lawsuit with specific opportunities to make further decisions 
at various points during litigation.  A by-product of state and federal rules of civil procedure is 
they naturally divide a lawsuit into a series of stages, at each of which plaintiffs and their 
attorneys have unilateral options to abandon the litigation.  
The second feature of litigation is that parties and their attorneys learn information 
concerning their litigation over the course of that litigation.  An important benefit of acquiring 
information to a decision-maker is the opportunity to make additional choices after obtaining that 
information.  Such potentially valuable opportunities are precisely what decision-makers gain 
122 See infra Appendix, proposition 1.
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from having options.123  This central and fundamental insight underlies Professors C. Frederick 
Beckner and Steven Salop's multi-stage decision model of sequential legal procedure, which 
computes the optimal standards of summary disposition (those minimizing the sum of 
information and error costs) and the optimal sequence of legal and factual issues which a court 
should take up;124 Professor Landes’ model about when a court should hold separate trials for 
liability versus damages as opposed to a unified trial which considers both issues;125 and 
Professor Warren F. Schwartz’s demonstration that separating determinations of damages from 
determinations of liability could reduce litigation costs.126
This Article fills a niche in the literature about (possibly, frivolous) litigation.127  This 
Article demonstrates how to harmoniously blend a real options approach to lawsuits with a 
strategic approach to pre-trial settlement bargaining.  The analytical model in the appendix of 
this Article builds upon and combines two major influences.  The first is research about real 
options, both in law and more generally, in strategic management.  The second is the literature 
consisting of game-theoretic models of litigation.  The model in the appendix of this Article 
integrates these related, but distinct strands of the literature about litigation into a unified game-
theoretic real options model of litigation.  Strategic real options models have only recently begun 
to appear in the financial and management literatures.128  These models can become quite 
mathematically complicated rather quickly.129
123
 Ronald A. Howard, Options, in WISE CHOICES: DECISIONS, GAMES, AND NEGOTIATIONS 81 (Richard J. 
Zeckhauser, et al. eds., 1996).
124
 C. Frederick Beckner, III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67 ANTITRUST L. J. 41 
(1999).
125
 Landes, supra note 95.
126
 Warren F. Schwartz, Severance - A Means of Minimizing the Role of Burden and Expense in Determining the 
Outcome of Litigation, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1197 (1967).
127
 Bone, supra note 109, at 542 n.81 (noting that existing options approach to litigation fails to incorporate strategic 
interaction between litigants).   
128 See generally, BRACH, supra note 13, at 33-74 (providing an introduction to games involving shared real 
options) and Han T. J. Smit & L. A. Ankum, A Real Options and Game-Theoretic Approach to Corporate 
Investment Strategy Under Competition, Autumn FIN. MGMT. 241 (1993).
129 See generally, GAME CHOICES: THE INTERSECTION OF REAL OPTIONS AND GAME THEORY (Steven Grenadier ed., 
2000) (presenting selected papers that provide theoretical foundations for and practical, state-of-the-art applications 
of strategic real options models).  See also, Steven R. Grenadier, Option Exercise Games: The Intersection of Real 
Options and Game Theory, 13 J. APPL. CORP. FIN. 99 (2000); Grenadier, supra note 45; VOLLERT, supra note 14.
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The model in the appendix of this Article clarifies how and why real options analysis 
explains when (possibly, frivolous) litigation can be nonetheless credible for plaintiffs to file and 
for defendants to settle.  Of course, not all possibly, frivolous lawsuits are going to be credible 
for plaintiffs to file and for defendants to settle.  In fact, the appendix of this Article proves that 
only lawsuits, including possibly frivolous ones, with positive net (of their expected option 
premia) abandonment real option values are credible for plaintiffs to file and for defendants to 
settle.130  In other words, the gross real abandonment option values for each stage of litigation 
must exceed the cost of that stage of litigation.  The model in the appendix of this Article 
demonstrates that lawsuits that have positive net expected values will also have positive net real 
option values.  Thus, any lawsuit with positive expected value (PEV), will be credible for a 
plaintiff to file and for a defendant to settle.131
The key intuition for why any lawsuit, including NEV lawsuits, must have positive gross 
real abandonment option value is that any random variable’s abandonment option value is larger 
than or equal to its expected value.  This is true because the abandonment option value of a 
random variable can be thought of as being equal to that random variable’s expected value when 
all of the negative value realizations of that random variable are replaced by zero.  Such a 
conceptualization of the abandonment option value of a random variable insightfully captures the 
pragmatic and valuable feature that real abandonment options provide, namely the flexibility to 
avoid negative outcome realizations of the underlying random variable.  Thus, the abandonment 
option value of any random variable, including that of a plaintiff’s expected judgment at 
litigation, must be non-negative by definition.
Several economists developed a concept of an option value or quasi-option value in the 
particular context of environmental preservation and in the more general setting of decision 
130 See infra Appendix, proposition 1.
131 See infra Appendix, proposition 2.
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making under conditions of risk.132  The relationship of such option values to real options has 
caused some confusion in the literature.133  By the phrase, the option value of a random variable, 
this Article simply means the expected value of that random variable, but with all of its negative 
value realizations replaced by zero.  From this definition of the option value of a random 
variable, it follows that at every date, the option value of any random variable exceeds the 
expected value of any random variable.  
The model in the appendix of this Article provides four principal ways in which any 
evidentiary, procedural, or substantive rule (or change in such a rule) can increase the value of a 
plaintiff’s litigation abandonment option, namely: 1) increasing the variance of trial judgment 
awards;134 2) increasing the divisibility of plaintiff’s legal costs;135 3) back-loading plaintiff’s 
litigation costs;136 and 4) decreasing plaintiff’s total litigation costs.137
The real options game-theoretic model of litigation in the appendix of this Article differs 
from expected value game-theoretic models of litigation in terms of its predictions.  For example, 
a mean-preserving increase (or decrease) in the variance of judgment at trail has no impact on the
incentives to file or the Nash equilibrium settlement amounts in expected value game-theoretic 
models of litigation involving risk-neutral parties.  But, a mean-preserving increase (respectively, 
decrease) in the variance of judgment at trail increases (respectively, decreases) the incentives to 
file and the Nash equilibrium settlement amounts in the real options game-theoretic model of 
litigation involving risk-neutral parties.138  The intuition and reason for this difference in the 
132
 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow & Anthony C. Fisher, Environmental Preservation, Uncertainty, and Irreversibility, 
88 QUART. J. ECON. 312, 315 (1974); W. Michael Hanemann, Information and the Concept of Option Value, 16 J. 
ENVIRON. ECON. & MGMT. 23, 27 (1989); and Claude Henry, Investment Decisions under Uncertainty: The 
‘Irreversibility Effect,’” 64 AM. ECON. REV. 1006, 1007 (1974).
133
 Anthony C. Fisher, Investment under Uncertainty and Option Value in Environmental Economics, 22 RESOURCE 
& ENERGY ECON. 197, 202-03 (2000) (offering a unifying framework); and Paul Mesnick & Till Requate, The 
Dixit- Pindyck and the Arrow-Fisher-Hanemann-Henry Option Values Are Not Equivalent, RESOURCE & ENERGY
ECON. (forthcoming 2003).
134 See infra Appendix, proposition 6.
135 See infra Appendix, proposition 10.
136 See infra Appendix, proposition 12.
137 See infra Appendix, proposition 14.
138 See infra Appendix, proposition 6.
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predictions of expected value game-theoretic models of litigation versus the real options game-
theoretic model of litigation is that risk-neutral litigants only care about expected values and not 
variance in expected value game-theoretic models of litigation.  But, in a real options game-
theoretic model of litigation, the option values of the settlement amounts from litigation depend 
not only upon expected values, but also variances of random variables even with even risk-
neutral litigants.  An application of this that filing of (possibly, frivolous) litigation is more likely 
under the English rule than under the American rule for allocating legal costs.  
While the appendix of this Article develops a multi-period real options model of lawsuits, 
this general approach to litigation can be illustrated by making the simplifying assumption that 
litigation consists of two stages only, namely discovery and trial.  Filing a lawsuit and surviving 
a defendant's motion to dismiss it for failure to state a claim139 (modern liberal rules of pleading 
allow the survival of a fairly broad class of claims) allows a plaintiff’s lawyers to engage in 
discovery.  Thus, before discovery, the plaintiff has filed suit and initial motions, but has not yet 
engaged in any real discovery.  Legal fees up to then are usually small in comparison with the 
sizable and irreversible amounts incurred by discovery.  In fact, an empirical survey of attorneys 
found lawyers reporting that about fifty percent of the aggregate costs of litigation are discovery 
costs.140  A plaintiff must decide whether to incur those significant discovery costs.  
But, a plaintiff is not locked into proceeding with a trial even if she decides to have her 
attorney engage in discovery.  In fact, discovery results in the gathering of information and the 
updating of probability beliefs over the plaintiff prevailing at trial.  The various federal and state 
rules governing discovery confer upon parties legal rights to obtain information from other 
parties before trial via document requests, interrogatories, and the deposition of witnesses.  But, 
attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine both limit what information another party 
139
 Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
140
 THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE PRACTICE, PROBLEMS, AND PROPOSALS FOR 
CHANGE 15 (Federal Judicial Center 1997).
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can discover.141  The process of discovery provides a plaintiff's attorney with the opportunity to 
conduct research into a case and develop it further if it looks promising (in terms of an expected 
judgment or a settlement), but recommend that a plaintiff drop the case if the case does not look 
promising (in terms of an expected judgment or a settlement).  For simplicity, assume that 
discovery completely resolves the uncertainty over the actual merits of a case.  Then, after 
discovery, both sides of the case will know the probability of plaintiff prevailing at trial is either 
zero or one.  In the second period, a plaintiff will be willing to incur the sizable and irreversible 
costs of trial if she learns that she has a sure winner, while a plaintiff will drop the case 
unilaterally if she learns that she has a sure loser.    
There are many sophisticated game-theoretic models of discovery;142 discovery rules;143
and efficient discovery.144  Discovery generates benefits and costs that differ significantly 
between plaintiff and defendant.145  When the plaintiff is an individual and the defendant is a 
doctor, corporation, or even just another individual, for example; the cost for that defendant of 
complying with a plaintiff's discovery requests for non-privileged, relevant documents can be 
quite substantial.146  There is a clear potential for discovery abuse because of the externality 
involved where plaintiffs receive the informational benefits of discovery, but defendants bear its 
costs.147  So, even if the discovery request will likely produce benefits which exceed its costs, 
141
 Ronald J. Allen et al., A Positive Theory of the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine, 19 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 359 (1990) (offering an economic model of the procedural limits on discovery based upon their 
incentive effects).
142 See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discovery, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 
435, 438 (1994) (providing a general strategic analysis of discovery).  See also, Bruce L. Hay, Civil Discovery: Its 
Effects and Optimal Scope, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 481 (1994) (extending Cooter & Rubinfeld’s analysis).  
143
 Joel Sobel, An Analysis of Discovery Rules, 52 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 133 (1989).  
144
 Robert Mnookin & Robert Wilson, A Model of Efficient Discovery, 25 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 219 (1998).  
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 Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 636 (1989) (expressing judicial concern over 
discovery abuse).  But see, Linda S. Mullenix,  Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery 
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one party receives the benefits from, while another party bears the costs of, discovery.148  Thus, 
even if a discovery request is socially desirable (in the sense that its benefits exceed its costs); it 
can provide a small plaintiff an advantage over a large defendant as in Professors David 
Rosenberg & Steven Shavell's analysis of NEV lawsuits.149  Although both sides to a lawsuit can 
make discovery requests, a plaintiff does not incur much cost in complying with discovery 
requests when she lacks "truckloads of documents."150  The costs of complying with discovery 
requests illustrates how litigation abandonment options may create problems akin to a strategy of 
raising rival's costs in the context of business competition and the game-theoretic industrial 
organization literature.151
More generally, any lawsuit consists of not just discovery and trial stages, but also at 
least several of these stages: the plaintiff’s lawyer files a complaint; the defendant’s lawyer files 
a pre-answer motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint, e.g. under the federal rules of civil 
procedure, a motion to “for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted”;152 the 
defendant’s lawyer answers the compliant by making admissions,153 making denials,154 raising 
affirmative defenses,155 or filing counterclaims or cross claims;156 the lawyers file third party 
complaints;157 the lawyers amend or supplement their pleadings;158 the lawyers make any 
required automatic disclosures;159 the lawyers conduct, object to, and respond to discovery 
148
 John K. Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics of Cooperation, Nuclear Deterrence, and Discovery 
Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 569, 581 (1989) (differentiating between informational benefits and impositional benefits of 
discovery requests).  
149
 Rosenberg & Shavell, supra note 116.
150 See also, COOTER & ULEN, supra note 77, at 412 (illustrating how “[e]xternalizing compliance costs provides an 
incentive for discovery abuse.”). But see, CLASS ACTION (20th Century Fox, 1991) (depicting how a defendant’s 
lawyer can bury a plaintiff’s attorney with literally truckloads of documents in complying with a discovery request).  
151 See, e.g., William P. Rogerson, A Note on the Incentive for a Monopolist to Increase Fixed Costs as a Barrier to 
Entry, 99 QUART. J. ECON. 399 (1984).
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requests for the production of documents;160 the lawyers send and answer interrogatories;161 the 
lawyers take oral depositions;162 the lawyers request and comply with court orders for 
independent medical physical or mental examinations;163 the lawyers promulgate and respond to 
requests for admissions;164 the lawyers file and respond to motions for summary judgment;165 the 
lawyers proceed to trial by among other things, conducting opening arguments, examining and 
cross-examining witnesses,166 presenting non-testimonial evidence, and making closing 
arguments; the lawyers file and respond to motions for judgment as a matter of law before a 
verdict (also known under some state rules of civil procedure as motions for summary 
judgment);167 the lawyers file and respond to motions for judgment as a matter of law after the 
verdict (also known under some state rules of civil procedure as motions for j.n.o.v., which 
stands for judgment non obstante veredicto);168 the lawyers file and respond to motions for a new 
trial;169 and finally, the lawyers file and respond to motions to alter or amend a judgment.170
Thus, litigation is a multi-stage process that provides plaintiffs not just a single option, 
but instead a sequence of abandonment options analogous to those found in sequential 
investment.  Litigation abandonment options have several interesting features.  First, plaintiffs do 
not pay litigation abandonment option premia to defendants, but instead to plaintiffs' attorneys.  
If plaintiffs are not paying clients, but instead suing under contingency fee arrangements or 
attorney fee award statutes, then plaintiff’s attorneys incur litigation abandonment option premia 
up front.  Second, defendants provide these litigation options to plaintiffs by virtue of their 
activity choices and relevant substantive and procedural laws.   Third, plaintiffs’ abandonment 
160
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161
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options are similar to the real options, which a natural resources company, oil refinery, 
pharmaceutical company, petrochemical firm, or in fact any business that is engaged in research 
and development (R&D) has to abandon product or process innovation.171   But, a very important 
difference between a plaintiff’s litigation abandonment options and those in R&D is that lawsuits 
are wasteful from the joint perspective of plaintiffs, defendants, and perhaps, society as a whole 
if the costs imposed upon a court, a judge, and jury, if there is one, exceed the precedent and 
process values from adjudication of the litigation.  On the other hand, a corporation engaging in 
R&D, its employees, its equity owners, its debt holders, its current and future customers, the 
surrounding community, and possibly other third-parties all serve to gain from the development 
and sale of a new product.  In litigation, the plaintiff and the defendant will jointly lose if they 
make investments in a lawsuit as opposed to resolve their differences via some alternative 
dispute resolution method.
II. Limitations of Strategic Litigation Option Analysis
This part of the Article appraises limitations of a real options game-theoretic approach to 
litigation.  Some of these limitations in the particular context of litigation are the result of general 
behavioral limitations to game-theoretic analysis.172  First, there are cognitive limitations in how 
people conceptualize, frame, make, process, and understand choices over time.173  Second, 
traditional or non-psychological game-theoretic models assume that people do not experience 
171
 See, e.g., Terrence W. Faulkner, Applying ‘Options Thinking’ to R&D Valuation, 39 RES. TECH. MGMT. 50 
(1996); HARIOLF GRUPP & SHLOMO MAITAL, Innovation Investment as Doors to the Future: A Real Options 
Approach, in MANAGING NEW PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT AND INNOVATION: A MICROECONOMIC TOOLBOX 39-53 
(2001); and Graham R. Mitchell & William F. Hamilton, Managing R&D as a Strategic Option, May-June RES. 
TECH. MGMT. 15 (1988).
172 See generally COLIN F. CAMERER, BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY: EXPERIMENTS ON STRATEGIC INTERACTION
(2003) (providing an excellent overview to experimental research about how people actually play games).
173 See generally, TIME AND DECISION: ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERMPORAL CHOICE 
(George Loewenstein et al. eds., 2003) (presenting a fascinating interdisciplinary collection of articles about the 
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any emotions or feelings.  Both of these limitations are particularly serious in litigation settings 
because most litigation is quite time-consuming and emotionally draining, if not protracted and 
contentious.  Fortunately, even if litigants themselves are myopic and overly emotional, their 
lawyers might be more farsighted and less emotional.  Unfortunately, lawyers may exacerbate 
cognitive and emotional issues due to conflicts of interests and repeat play considerations 
involving developing a reputation for being tough or playing hardball in pre-trial settlement 
negotiations.174   This part of the Article considers these limitations in turn and possible 
responses.  
A. Cognitive Limitations
The standard procedure for solving dynamic games of complete information utilizes a 
technique known as backward induction.175  This method for calculating an equilibrium solution 
to an extensive form game of perfect information starts by determining the optimal choice for the 
player who moves last; then determining the optimal course of action for the player who moves 
penultimately, and so forth until determining the optimal decision for the player who moves first.  
An alternative way to understand backward induction focuses on the sequential rationality of 
players’ strategies.  The requirement of sequential rationality is related to another intuitive 
notion, that of credibility of threats.  Professor Bebchuk systematically applied the credibility 
constraint in his approach to NEV lawsuits.176
174 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between 
Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 514-15 (1994) (illustrating the possibility of a prisoner’s dilemma 
situation where both litigants withhold information from each other and their lawyers file motions to compel 
disclosure).  But see, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and 
Clients, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 165 (2003) (proposing a variation of the standard contingent fee system for 
compensating lawyers that overcomes the conflict of interest between clients and their lawyers).
175
 Robert Gibbons, An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 145 (1994).
176
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As Professor Bebchuk noted, backward induction arguments have become standard in 
studying multi-period strategic environments.177 The history of backward induction arguments 
dates back (at least) to Zermelo’s demonstration that in chess, either white or black can ensure 
itself a draw regardless of how the other side plays.178  Later, the philosopher, Kierkegaard said, 
“[i]t is perfectly true, as philosophers say, that life must be understood backwards.  But they 
forgot the other proposition, that it must be lived forwards.”179  Similarly, backward induction 
arguments presume that decision-makers have the computational ability to and in fact do 
correctly forecast all of the future choices that are to be made in a game.180  The longer and/or 
more complex that a game is, the more descriptively problematic is the assumption of rational 
expectations about strategic decisions.181
Numerous experiments demonstrate that people are quite limited in their ability to 
perform backwards induction for even relatively simple game situations.182  The inconsistency 
between empirical experimental play results and backward induction based solutions for a 
famous game called the centipede game illustrates the predictive limitations of using backward 
induction arguments for sufficiently lengthy games.183  Even in only two-stage or three-stage 
sequential bargaining experimental games, subjects actually play very differently from backward 
induction based equilibrium solutions for those games.184  One way to resolve these and related 
backward induction paradoxes is to “introduce some uncertainty into the players’ knowledge of 
177 Id., at 6 & n. 7.
178
 E. Zermelo, Uber eine Anwendung der Mengenlehre auf die Theorie des Schachspiels, 2 PROC. FIFTH INT’L
CONG. MATHEMATICIANS 501 (1913).
179
 SOREN KIERKEGAARD, THE JOURNALS OF SOREN KIERKEGAARD (1938).
180
 MORROW supra note 103, at 157.
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182 See, e.g., THEODORE C. BERGSTROM & JOHN H. MILLER, EXPERIMENTS WITH ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 395 
(1997).
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each other’s payoffs.”185  Such a resolution, however, voids the assumption of common 
knowledge of rationality which underlies the method of backward induction.  
The game-theoretic analysis of litigation real options in the appendix of this Article 
utilizes backward induction arguments to analyze lawsuits despite the above concerns being 
disturbing and convincing.  In defense of using backward induction arguments in analyzing 
lawsuits, litigants have financial and psychological incentives to be sequentially rational.  
Litigants are more likely to be sequentially rational than experimental subjects, who may face 
artificial time constraints and might lack the motivations of greed and emotional responses more 
often than not found in litigation.186  Also, even if the litigants themselves fail to be sequentially 
rational due, for example, to cognitive difficulties, they hire lawyers who provide not only legal 
knowledge and expertise, but also negotiating experience and professionalism.  Presumably, part 
of being a professional is not making incredible threats. In a sense, then, litigation involves 
professionals who have reasons to be sequentially rational.  Of course, both defendants’ and 
plaintiffs’ attorneys are often repeat players and their behavior might be rational across cases as 
opposed to within any given case.  A final defense is the often-made hand waving argument that 
market reputation and competition discipline lawyers who fail to be sequentially rational. 
B. Emotional and Psychological  Factors
Almost all formal economic models of litigation focuses primarily on the monetary 
incentives to sue, settle or proceed to a trial.  An exception is provided by Professors Huang & 
Ho-mou Wu’s psychological game-theoretic models of litigation.  Their models demonstrate  
how such emotions as anger, outrage, and shock can prevent or delay settlement in litigation by 
185
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changing the incentives of parties to sue, settle, or go to trial.187  In addition, the U.S. Supreme 
Court described and endorsed the wide-ranging rights of parties to control and participate in their 
litigation based upon a psychological theory of process-based value to precluding feelings of 
unjust treatment.188  Empirical and experimental psychological research demonstrates that people 
are more likely to accept an adverse outcome and to believe that an adjudicatory process is fair if 
they have the opportunity to personally participate in that process, have their day, and have the 
adjudicator hear their stories and their voice.189  Emotional considerations usually predominate in 
particular (legal) areas, including, but not necessarily limited to battery, child custody, criminal 
offenses, defamation, divorce, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
invasion of privacy, medical malpractice, products liability (especially involving bodily injury), 
and worker’s compensation.   
Whether a lawsuit has a positive or negative expected value to a plaintiff, a lawsuit 
always has net negative expected value to a defendant (ignoring the filing of counterclaims) 
because of a defendant’s litigation costs.  Indeed, avoiding the incurring of such costs is often the 
rationale for settlement.  In reality, it is not just legal costs, but also the opportunity costs and 
harms to a defendant’s reputation of having to deal with a lawsuit which might lead a defendant 
to settle a lawsuit by effectively purchasing the plaintiff’s litigation continuation options.  An 
often used pejorative term is that of vexatious litigation.  In a well-known quotation from a 
securities fraud lawsuit, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, William Rhenquist, spoke of the 
danger of “vexatious litigation” which could result from the prosecution of “a complaint which 
187 Id. See also, William G. Morrison, Instincts as Reflex Choice: Does Loss of Temper Have Strategic Value?, 31 J. 
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 335 (1996) (demonstrating in games based upon biological conflict models that subordinate 
players can benefit from losing their temper in asymmetric contests with dominant opponents and that such 
instinctual temper can be robust against evolutionary pressures and persist over time) and Glenn Feltham  & William 
G. Morrison, Civil Disputes, the Allocation of Legal Costs and Emotional Litigation (1995) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author) (modeling the possibility of a plaintiff reacting emotionally to a defendant’s low 
pre-trial settlement offer by becoming insulted, losing her temper and making a reflex choice to proceed to trial 
instead of settle, regardless of the monetary consequences to her of doing so).
188 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 260-61 (1978).
189 See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 26-40, 61-83, 
93-127 (1988) (presenting this research).
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by objective standards may have very little chance of success at trial” because, among other 
reasons, “the very pendency of the lawsuit may frustrate or delay normal business activity of the 
defendant which is totally unrelated to the lawsuit.”190  Exactly what constitutes a vexatious 
lawsuit is debatable in the same manner as precisely what constitutes a frivolous lawsuit.  But, 
certainly examples of non-monetary aspects of vexatious litigation include heated emotional 
considerations motivating a plaintiff’s use of a lawsuit out of anger to harass a defendant.
A recent set of psychological experiments indicate that decision makers generally 
overvalue their options and exhibit a willingness to invest greater effort and larger sums of 
money to keep options viable, even when such options have little intrinsic value.191  The 
tendencies uncovered experimentally were robust with regard to information regarding 
outcomes, more experience, and saliency about option costs.192  In other words, options may 
offer subjective values exceeding their decision-theoretic value for two psychological reasons.  
First, people sometimes derive pleasure from just “having the right to choose.”193  This 
phenomenon is perhaps related to a desire for or illusion of control.194  Second, people 
sometimes experience loss aversion and a type of endowment effect for options.195  This 
phenomenon is related to the phenomenon of litigants experiencing framing effects as described 
by prospect theory causing frivolous litigation and lack of settlement during pre-trial 
bargaining.196
190 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729 (1975).
191
 Shin & Ariely, supra note 69.
192 Id.
193 But see, Ziv Carmon et al., Option Attachment: When Deliberating Makes Choosing Feel Like Losing, 30 J. 
CONSUMER RES. 15 (2003) (presenting experimental evidence that considering options more closely may induce 
consumers to become attached to choice options and feel discomfort after choice) and Sheena S. Iyengar & Mark R. 
Lepper, When Choice is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much of a Good Thing, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 995 (2000) (providing both field and laboratory experimental evidence of participants reporting higher 
satisfaction when their options were limited).
194
 Ellen J. Langer, The Illusion of Control, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 311 (1975).
195 Id.
196 See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 163 (2000) 
and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,  Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113 (1996).   
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III. Other Legal Applications of Real Options
This Article has thus far analyzed some elements and rules of civil procedure from the 
perspective of regulating the sequence of embedded real options to continue, drop, modify, or 
settle litigation.  There are many other litigation real options arising in civil procedure.  For 
example, real options analysis can inform procedural rules governing class actions.197  A well-
known result in option valuation is that a call option written on a portfolio of assets must cost 
less than the corresponding portfolio consisting of individual options written on those individual 
assets.198  One can think of a class action as a portfolio made up of the lawsuits of the individual 
members of the class action.  The above option valuation result implies the option value of a 
class action is less than the sum of the option values of the individual member lawsuits.  
The practice of remittitur, in which a trial court denies a defendant’s motion for a new 
trial conditional on a plaintiff accepting an award smaller than issued by a jury, provides further 
examples of litigation real options.199  If a plaintiff rejects the lower amount and faces a new 
trial, that plaintiff can appeal the grant of the second trial after its conclusion. But, should a 
plaintiff accept such a lower award, that plaintiff cannot appeal the conditional ruling of the trial 
court.200  In the language of real options, remittitur involves a court presenting a plaintiff with an 
option to accept less than a jury award in exchange for a defendant not being permitted to 
exercise it option for a new trial.  Some states allow for the practice of additur, in which a court 
symmetrically denies a plaintiff’s motion for a new trial conditional on a defendant accepting 
more liability than a jury awarded.  But, the United States Supreme Court prohibited additur in 
federal practice as being in violation of the Seventh Amendment.201  From a real options 
197
 Fed.R.Civ.P. 23.
198 See, e.g., RICHARD M. BOOKSTABER, OPTION PRICING AND INVESTMENT STRATEGIES 26-27, tbl. 2-3 (3d ed.
1991) and Merton, supra note 28, at 148 theorem 7.
199 Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc, 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
200 Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648 (1977).
201 Dmick v. Schiedt., 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
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perspective, additur involves a court presenting a defendant with an option to accept more 
liability than a jury award in exchange for a plaintiff not being permitted to exercise her option 
for a new trial.    
Real options theory provides not only descriptive or positive analysis, but also 
prescriptive or normative analysis, of legal behavior.  For example, a manufacturer should factor 
into the price of her product a per unit amount for covering the option values of products liability 
cases, which are larger than merely expected litigation costs or damage awards from defending 
or settling products liability cases.202 Another example is realizing that, ceteris paribus, the 
deterrence impact of settlements or trials based upon the option values of litigation exceed the 
deterrence impact of settlements or trials based upon their expected monetary damage awards.203
This relative comparison applies equally forcefully to deterrence of harms from accidents, 
contract breaches, governmental takings of private property, and nuisances.204  A final example 
is to analyze how litigation abandonment real options affect Professors George Priest and 
Benjamin Klein’s selective litigation hypothesis that a non-random sample of all cases filed 
result in trial.205
202 See also, Blanton, supra note 86, at 185 n.135, 186 n.137; COOTER & ULEN, supra note 77, at 345 -6 (noting “the 
cost of liability will be captured in the price”); MICELI, supra note 79, at 29-32; A. MITCHELL POLINKSY, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS , 97-98, tbl. 11 (providing a hypothetical numerical example of the price of 
a product including expected accident losses).
203 See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Deterrent Effects of Settlements and Trials, 8 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 109 (1988).
204
 Robert D. Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1985).
205
 George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).  See 
also, Theodore Eisenberg,  Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 337 (1990); Keith N. Hylton,  Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for Trial, 22 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 187 (1993); MICELI, supra note 79, at 158-59; George L. Priest, Reexamining the Selection 
Hypothesis: Learning from Wittman’s Mistakes, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 215 (1985); L. Stanley & Don Coursey, 
Empirical Evidence on the Selection Hypothesis and the Decision to Litigate or Settle, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 145 
(1990); R. Thomas, The Trial Selection Hypothesis without the 50 Percent Rule: Some Experimental Evidence, 24 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 209 (1995); Joel Waldfogel, The Selection Hypothesis and the Relationship Between Trial and 
Plaintiff Victory, 103 J. POL. ECON. 229 (1995); Joel Waldfogel, Selection of Cases for Trial, in 3 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 419 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Donald Wittman, Is the 
Selection of Cases for Trial Biased? 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 185 (1985); and Donald Wittman, Dispute Resolution, 
Bargaining, and the Selection of Cases for Trial: A Study of the Generation of Biased and Unbiased Data, 17 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 313 (1988).
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This final part of the Article applies real options analysis to negligence in torts; 
preclusion law; constitutional law; and family law.  Constraints of space and time only permit a 
brief glimpse of the full potential of these applications of real options to law.  For example, in the 
medical malpractice area, Professor Jeffrey O’Connell and several co-authors have proposed a 
reform plan under which a physician has the option to make a plaintiff an early offer to pay for 
economic losses in the form of medical expenses and lost wages.206  In exchange for accepting 
such an offer, a plaintiff relinquishes her option to sue for non-economic harms unless that 
plaintiff can prove the physician was guilty of gross criminal negligence.  Applying real options 
theory provides qualitative if not quantitative analysis of both a physician’s option to make such 
early offers and the forgone value of a patient’s option to sue for pain and suffering.207  Although 
all the possible applications below only pertain to civil actions, there are numerous legal options 
in the areas of criminal law and procedure, such as prosecutorial discretion and plea bargaining. 
A. Rethinking the “Calculus” of Negligence and the Hand Formula
 A number of scholars have applied microeconomics to analyze the common law of torts 
in general and of negligence in particular.208 Judge Learned Hand provided the most eminent 
articulation of the legal standard of negligence.209  Judge Hand stated that perhaps “it serves to 
206 See, e.g., Jeffrey O’Connell & Andrew S. Boutros, Treating Medical Malpractice Claims Under a Variant of the 
Business Judgment Rule, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 373 (2002); Jeffrey O’Connell & Patrick B. Bryan, More 
Hippocrates, Less Hypocrisy: "Early Offers" as a Means of Implementing the Institute of Medicine's 
Recommendations on Malpractice Law, 15 J.L. & HEALTH 23 (2000-01); Jeffrey O’Connell & Geoffrey Paul Eaton, 
Binding Early Offers as a Simple, if Second-Best, Alternative to Tort Law, 78 NEB. L. REV. 858 (1999); and Jeffrey 
O’Connell & James F. Neale, HMO's, Cost Containment, and Early Offers: New Malpractice Threats and A 
Proposed Reform, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. POL’Y. 287 (1998).
207
 Peter H. Huang, A Real Options Analysis of Medical Malpractice: Plaintiffs’ Litigation Abandonment Options 
(Aug. 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
208 See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); RICHARD A. 
EPSTEIN, A THEORY OF STRICT LIABILITY: TOWARD A REFORMULATION OF TORT LAW (1980); WILLIAM M. LANDES 
& RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); and STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987).
209 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).  
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bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic terms: if the probability be called P; the injury 
L; and the burden B; liability depends on whether B is less than L multiplied by P; i.e., whether 
B < PL.”210  Thus, the famous “Hand formula” is a simple inequality.  Hand’s formulation 
suggests that a reasonable person will take a precaution against injury when the burden from so 
doing is exceeded by the loss if the injury occurs multiplied by the probability of that injury 
occurring.  The American Law Institute adopted the negligence calculus that motivates the Hand 
formula in various Restatements of the Law of Torts.211
Of course, to be unambiguous and correct, Hand’s formula must be stated in a form that 
compares marginal precaution costs and marginal expected injury.212  It would seem that the 
Hand formula captures in a succinct and parsimonious way a simple test for determining socially 
efficient precautions.213  But, Hand never conceived of his formulation as being a mechanical 
tool for determining reasonable behavior.  In fact, Hand later suggested that it is impossible to 
quantify the variables in his formula.214  The Hand formula’s most important contribution might 
be that it conjures up a balancing thought process.
But, as helpful an impressionistic and intuitive heuristic as the Hand formula is, or 
perhaps because of its Spartan simplicity, the Hand formula clearly takes an expected value 
approach to injury by multiplying the loss if an injury occurs by the probability of injury.  The 
Hand formula does not account for any possibilities for undertaking such real options as 
permanently or temporarily abandoning the risky conduct in question.  Similarly, precaution 
usually does not involve a lump-sum once-and-for-all burden, but instead a sequence of 
incremental burdens.  Thus, a real options version of the Hand formula would replace B < PL by 
210 Id. at 173.  
211
 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 291(1) (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 291-293 (1965); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM BASIC PRINCIPLES (1998).
212 See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 77, at 333-37; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 168 
n.2 (6th ed. 2003).
213
 Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).  But see, Richard W. Wright, Hand, 
Posner, and the Myth of the “Hand Formula.” 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 1 (2003) (arguing that judicial 
opinions and jury instructions do not make use of the Hand formula).
214 Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1949).  
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a series of inequalities, namely for all t = 1, …, n; bt < OVt(L), where bt denotes the cost of 
precaution in period t and OVt(L) denotes the option value in period t of the injury.  
The option value in period t of the injury L, OVt(L), differs from PL, the expected value 
of the injury L in at least two ways.  First, a real options approach permits for the probability of 
injury being revised or updated over time in light of additional precautions.  Second, the real 
options perspective allows for the undertaking of real options, including additional precautions.  
Notice that for all t = 1, …, n; PL = EV1(L) < OVt(L), where P is the initial probability of the 
injury and EV1(L) denotes the initial expected value of the injury.  Assume, as is plausibly the 
case, that B = 1nbt and for all t = 1, …, n; bt  0.  If B < PL, then B < OVt(L) and so bt < 
OVt(L).  This reasoning demonstrates that any cost-justified precaution under the Hand formula 
remains a cost-justified precaution under a real options version of the Hand formula.  But, the 
converse is false.  In other words, some behavior that is negligent under the Hand formula would 
not be negligent under a real options version of the Hand formula.  
B. Legal Preclusions
This Article demonstrates that many legal procedural and substantive rules provide 
options that are valuable because they provide flexibility.  It is well-known conversely that 
inflexibility can be advantageous in strategic bargaining.215  Economists and game-theorists often 
speak of people utilizing (pre)commitment devices to improve their bargaining position.  
Automobile salespeople, one member of a couple, and employers often claim their hands are 
tied. A real options perspective about law also reveals that numerous legal doctrines and rules
increase the price of, if not preclude, certain other legal options.  For example, both the model 
code of professional responsibility and the model rules of professional conduct preclude certain 
behavior available to lawyers as options.  For another example, both state and federal sovereigns 
215 See. e.g., MCMILLAN. supra note 102, at 53-57.  
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have developed a number of self-limitation doctrines and statutes that decline to exercise their 
full adjudicatory Constitutional authority over non-local cases.216  Most prominent among these 
subconstitutional restrictions on geographic forum selection are the law of venue and forum 
nonconveniens.217
The judicially created doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata are part of 
preclusion law, which regulates how a judgment in one lawsuit governs future litigation.218  Res 
judicata, also known as claim preclusion, bars any party from suing again for the same 
underlying occurrence or transaction.219  For example, if Paula Plaintiff sued her Doctor 
Defendant for negligence during the delivery of her baby, then Paula is barred from suing for 
breach of contract for the delivery of her baby whether Paula wins or loses her first medical 
malpractice litigation.  Res judicata thus prevents new litigation motivated by different legal 
theories or types of relief that should have been, but were not, litigated initially.  The rationale 
for res judicata is to encourage plaintiffs to get it right initially by collecting all of the facts and 
related legal theories in just a single lawsuit.      
Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, proscribes the same issues to be 
litigated again in subsequent lawsuits.  For example, suppose Baker buys two identical wood-
burning pizza ovens from their manufacturer, Acme.  One of these ovens blows up and Baker 
sues Acme for her injuries.  If Acme loses on the issue of negligence to Baker in a lawsuit for 
negligent design, then Baker can bind Acme to its adverse determination in another lawsuit for 
negligent design of the second oven if that oven also explodes a month later.  Collateral estoppel 
prevents the litigation of issues that have already been litigated to a judgment by a court.  
Collateral estoppel thus avoids duplicative litigation of the same issue.  For the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel to preclude an issue, that issue must have been the same as in a prior lawsuit, 
216 See, e.g., KEVIN M. CLERMONT, CIVIL PROCEDURE: TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND VENUE 27 (1999).
217 Id., at 27-30.
218 See, e.g., DAVID  SHAPIRO, PRECLUSION IN CIVIL ACTIONS (2001) (discussing the legal structure and history of 
preclusion law).
219
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §24 (1982).
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actually litigated in that prior lawsuit, decided in that prior lawsuit, and usually necessary for the 
court’s judgment in that prior lawsuit.220
The doctrine of mutuality only allows parties who were parties in the lawsuit in which an 
issue was decided to invoke collateral estoppel of that issue.  All of the federal courts have 
substantially eroded the doctrine of mutuality.  The doctrine of non-mutual collateral estoppel 
permits a third party to bind a party in a prior action who lost on an issue in that action.  For 
example, if Defendant Drugs loses on the issue of deficiency to Phirst Plaintiff in a lawsuit for a 
defective warning, then under the doctrine of non-mutual collateral estoppel, other future 
plaintiffs can bind Defendant Drugs to its adverse determination from Phirst’s lawsuit.  The 
above hypothetical exemplifies offensive non-mutual estoppel, in which “the plaintiff seeks to 
foreclose the defendant from litigating an issue the defendant has previously litigated 
unsuccessfully in an action with another party.”221
Applying offensive non-mutual estoppel raises concerns of protecting defendants’ 
Seventh Amendment rights to a trial by jury in civil cases.222  The United States Supreme Court 
has neither categorically endorsed nor categorically rejected offensive non-mutual estoppel, 
holding instead that a lower court should consider whether a defendant would be unfairly 
prejudiced from permitting offensive non-mutual estoppel by considering various factors.223  In 
that case, the plaintiffs in a class action lawsuit against Parklane Hosiery invoked collateral 
estoppel on the issue of whether a proxy statement was false and misleading because a court had 
already held that same proxy statement was indeed false and misleading in  a prior lawsuit 
brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission.   
In contrast, defensive non-mutual estoppel “occurs when a defendant seeks to prevent a 
plaintiff from asserting a claim the plaintiff has previously litigated and lost against another 
220
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §27 (1982).
221 Parklane  Hosiery v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.4 (1979).
222
 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
223 Id. at 332 n.17.  See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §29 (1982) (detailing the factors that 
should be considered in analyzing non-mutual collateral estoppel).
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defendant.”224  The California Supreme Court first endorsed the doctrine of defensive non-
mutual estoppel in a case where a Mrs. Bernhard alleged that certain funds held by the estate’s 
executor, Cook, belonged to the estate.225  Cook replied the funds should not be included in the 
estate’s assets because they had been a gift from the decedent.  Mrs. Bernhard challenged Cook’s 
assertion in a probate hearing during settlement of the estate.  A court held that the funds were 
indeed a gift from the decedent to Cook.  Then, Bernhard sued Bank of America because it had 
held the funds and paid them to Cook, claiming again the funds were part of the estate’s assets 
and not Cook’s.  Bank of America pleaded collateral estoppel.  Justice Traynor emphasized that 
Bernhard was a party in the first action and already had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 
issue there.226
The United States Supreme Court first approved the doctrine of defensive non-mutual 
estoppel in case where the University of Illinois Foundation sued a defendant for patent 
infringement, but lost on the grounds that it had an invalid patent.227  The University of Illinois 
Foundation then brought suit against another defendant for infringement of the same patent.  The 
second defendant pleaded collateral estoppel and the Supreme Court held for the defendant, 
noting the unfairness of waste of judicial resources from permitting “repeated litigation of the 
same issue as long as the supply of unrelated defendants holds out.”228  Like the California 
Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court emphasized that defensive non-mutual estoppel 
is only appropriate when the precluded party already had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 
issue in the first action.229
224 Id.
225 Bernhard. v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass’n, 122 P.2d 892 (Cal. 1942).
226 Id. at 895.
227 Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
228 Id. at 329.
229 Id. at 332-34.
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The standard first-year of law school civil procedure casebook’s explanation for 
collateral estoppel and res judicata is achieving finality or the repose of judgments.230  Another 
traditional rationale for both collateral estoppel and res judicata is judicial economy.231  Finally, 
decisional consistency is often cited as an additional benefit of collateral estoppel and res 
judicata.232  But, collateral estoppel and res judicata both also influence the settlement values to 
litigation.  Professor Bruce L. Hay argues that collateral estoppel and res judicata both function 
to better align the settlement values of lawsuits with their merits.233  The few economic analyses 
of collateral estoppel and res judicata do not explicitly analyze these judicial doctrines from the 
vantage point of real options as clearly proscribe future litigation options.234  The perspective of 
this Article suggests analyzing the preclusion rules of collateral estoppel and res judicata 
specifically from a real options perspective.  
The United States Constitution requires that at least two-thirds of the members of both 
Houses of Congress vote to propose a constitutional amendment.235  Alternatively, two-thirds of 
the state legislatures must petition Congress to call a constitutional convention.236  The second 
method of proposing a constitutional amendment has never been utilized.  In addition, the United 
230
 BARBARA J. ALLEN BABCOCK & TONI M. MASSARO, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND PROBLEMS 1087 (2d ed. 
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CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND PROBLEMS 1093 (2003); LINDA SILBERMAN & ALAN R. 
STEIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 725 (2001); STEPHEN N. SUBRIN ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: 
DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, AND CONTEXT 884 (2000); and STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 797 (5th ed. 2000).
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 Hay, supra note 230, at 23 n.10.
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 Hay, supra note 230, at 31-51.
234
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Estoppel, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1940 (1992); POSNER, supra note 212, at 593-95; Stephen J. Spurr, An Economic 
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THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 289 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 593-95 (6th ed. 2003).  But see, Brainerd Currie, Mutuality of Collateral 
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States Constitution requires three-quarters of the state legislatures or state conventions to ratify a 
Constitutional amendment.237  The only amendment ratified by state conventions was the 
Twenty-first Amendment, which repealed Prohibition.238  Although there have been over eleven 
thousand constitutional amendments introduced in Congress since 1793, only thirty-three of 
these have received the requisite two-thirds vote of Congress to be submitted to the states for 
ratification.239  Of those, six were never ratified, including most notably, the Equal Rights 
Amendment proposed in 1972 and most recently, the D.C. Voting Rights Amendment proposed 
in 1978.240
The political value of precluding some amendment options helps to explain the above 
super-majoritarian requirements for the proposal and ratification of constitutional 
amendments.241  The constitutional amendment process “guards equally against that extreme 
facility, which would render the Constitution too mutable; and that extreme difficulty, which 
might perpetuate its discovered faults.”242
A similar concern about precluding judicial and legislative options helps explain why the 
current United States Supreme Court engages in judicial minimalism.243  Deciding a particular 
case not only decides that case on its merits, but it affects future activity, behavior and cases via 
precedent and the resulting effects on incentives.  In addition, the principles of analogical 
reasoning and the demands of logical consistency mean that any judicial decision may constrain 
or preclude future related legal options.    
Finally, as Professors Dixit and Pindyck suggested in their book, “[m]arriage entails 
significant costs of courtship, and divorce has its own monetary and emotional costs.  Happiness 
or misery within the marriage can be only imperfectly forecast in advance, and continues to 
237 Id.
238
 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
239
 LINDA R. MONK, THE WORDS WE LIVE BY: YOUR ANNOTATED GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION  116 (2003).
240 Id.
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fluctuate stochastically even after the event.  Therefore waiting for a better match has an option 
value.”244  The perspective of this Article suggests analyzing family law statutes in terms of how 
they regulate the options to marry or divorce.  For example, the family law statutes of many 
states require couples to wait for a specified period of time after the issuance of a marriage 
certificate before they can marry.245  Symmetrically, some of these states also stipulate that a 
couple may not divorce until after the passage of a mandatory waiting period, that usually 
exceeds the mandatory prenuptial waiting period.246  One can understand both types of such 
family law statutes as raising the waiting time or non-monetary price of, if not precluding, 
certain marriage or divorce options.  The debate over whether a state will recognize legally the 
marriage of gay and lesbian couples effectively concerns whether a state will preclude legal 
marriage options and the attendant legal rights (themselves options) that follow.  In fact, legal 
rights in general are real options their owners may choose not to exercise because of too low 
payoffs or too high strike prices. 
Conclusions
This Article advocates a new real options perspective to analyzing legal doctrines and 
rules.  In particular, this Article introduces a new real options game-theoretic model of (possibly, 
frivolous) litigation.  This novel theory is a hybrid approach that combines a real options 
approach to litigation incentives and game-theoretic models of pre-trial settlement negotiations.  
This Article derives a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the credible filing of 
(possibly, frivolous) litigation based on whether the real abandonment option values from 
244 DIXIT & PINDYCK, supra note 18, at 24.
245 See, e.g., 23 PA. C.S.A. § 1303 (“No marriage license shall be issued prior to the third day following the making 
of application therefor.”).
246 See, e.g., 23 PA. C.S.A. § 3301 (stating that a married couple must allege that their marriage is irretrievably 
broken, file affidavits that each party consents to a divorce, and wait ninety days after commencing such action 
before the court may grant a divorce).
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continuing litigation exceed the cost of those litigation abandonment options.  In other words, 
plaintiffs only credibly file and correspondingly, defendants only settle those (possibly, 
frivolous) lawsuits with initial positive net (of the cost of litigation) real abandonment option 
values. This Article also considers limitations of strategic litigation options analysis.  Finally, 
this Article very briefly introduces other applications of real options analysis to law, including 
reevaluating the “calculus” of negligence in torts by restating a real options version of the Hand 
formula, and pointing out preclusions of real options in various areas of law.
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Appendix: A Real Options Game-Theoretic Model of Litigation
This appendix introduces a real options model of (possibly, frivolous) litigation under the 
assumption that defendants and plaintiffs maximize their expected net wealth and initially have 
incomplete but, common knowledge regarding all information concerning their litigation.  This 
appendix adopts these quite strong assumptions to focus attention on the additional and novel 
insights provided by viewing litigation through the lens of real options theory.  This Article 
demonstrates that real options analysis generates different conclusions and implications from 
those of expected value analysis under an identical set of assumptions.  Litigation costs are 
stochastic processes in the real options game-theoretic model in this appendix.  More generally, 
litigants might choose the levels of litigation expenditures as endogenous variables as opposed to 
facing litigation costs that are exogenously distributed random variables.  It is left for another 
day to model endogenous litigation expenditures in a strategic real options analysis of litigation.  
A. Notation
The following notation is used in the formal model. Denote the plaintiff's total litigation 
costs by P.  Denote the defendant’s total litigation costs by D.  Divide the number of stages in 
pre-trial bargaining by the index t = 1, ..., n.  All money values at periods t > 1 are denominated 
in terms of their present discounted values at t = 1 (using a common discount rate or factor).  Let 
It represent the plaintiff's litigation costs at stage t.  Thus, by definition, P = 1nIt.  Let Ct
represent the defendant's litigation costs at stage t.  Then, by definition, D = 1nCt.  Let Pt
denote the plaintiff's remaining litigation costs after stage t.  Then, by definition, Pt = tnIk.  Let 
E1(Pt) denote the initial expected present value of plaintiff's remaining litigation costs once stage 
t is reached.  Let Dt denote the defendant’s remaining litigation costs once stage t is reached.  
Then, by definition, Dt = tnCk.  Let E1(Dt) denote the initial expected present value of 
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defendant's remaining litigation costs once stage t is reached.  Let  denote the relative 
bargaining strength of the plaintiff; so that, 0    1.  
At stage t, the size of the dollar amount of judgment expected at trial is Jt.  At stage t, the 
subjective probability of the plaintiff prevailing at trial is denoted pt.  At stage t, the expected 
value of the judgment expected at trial is defined as xt = ptJt.  Denote by E1(st) the initial net 
present discounted expected value of the settlement if the litigation settles at stage t.  Solving 
recursively via backwards induction, E1(st) = x1 + E1(Dt)-(1-)E1(Pt).  Let OV1(st) be the 
initial abandonment option value of the settlement at stage t.  Finally, let E1(It) be the initial 
present expected value of the plaintiff's litigation cost at stage t.
The following real options model of lawsuits assumes that {Jt}, {It} and {Ct} are 
stochastic processes, whose distributions are agreed upon and common knowledge among the 
litigants and their attorneys.  Recall the litigants are assumed to be risk-neutral, share a common 
discount rate and face no effective wealth constraints.  Finally, Jt, It and Ct are assumed to be 
independent random variables at each t.
B. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Credible Filing of Litigation
This characterization of the incentives to file lawsuits illustrates the power of backwards 
induction.
Proposition 1: A necessary and sufficient condition for a lawsuit to be filed is that the initial 
value of all the abandonment options exceed the initial value of their expected costs or premia.  
In other words, for all t = 1, ..., n; these inequalities hold at date 1:
OV1(st)  E1(It)
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Proof: (a) Necessity: If for any t  n, OV1(st) < E1(It); then both parties expect at stage 1 that the 
plaintiff will not continue the lawsuit at stage t.  Thus, reasoning backwards, both parties expect 
at stage 1 that the plaintiff's threat at stage t to continue the lawsuit is not credible.  
(b) Sufficiency: Conversely, if for all t  n, OV1(st)  E1(It), then both parties expect at stage 1 
that the plaintiff will at each stage t be able to credibly threaten to continue the lawsuit for its 
abandonment option value at that stage. 
It is straightforward to show that any Positive-Expected-Value (PEV) lawsuit will always 
satisfy the above condition. 
Proposition 2: If a lawsuit has PEV, then all of the abandonment options will have initial values 
that exceed their initial expected cost.  
Proof: A PEV lawsuit by definition satisfies x1  E1(P).  Because P = 1nIti and It  0 for all t, it 
follows that x1  E1(It) + E1(Pt) for all t.  So, x1  E1(It) and (1-)x1  (1-)E1(It)+(1-)E1(Pt) 
for all t. Adding these last two inequalities together results in the inequality, x1 – (1-)E1(Pt) 
E1(It) for all t.  This implies that x1 + E1(Dt)-(1-)E1(Pt)  E1(It) for all t because E1(Dt)  0.   
But, E1(st) = x1 + E1(Dt)-(1-)E1(Pt) by definition.  So, for all t; E1(st)  E1(It).  Finally, by the 
definition of abandonment option value, we conclude that for all t; OV1(st)  E1(st)  E1(It). 
Thus, a lawsuit having PEV is a sufficient, but not necessary condition for a lawsuit to be 
credibly filed by a plaintiff.  The last step in the proof of the above corollary, namely that for all 
t; OV1(st)  E1(st) is merely an instance of the more general proposition that at every date, the 
abandonment option value of a random variable is greater than its expected value.  This is true 
because the abandonment option value of a random variable can be thought of as being equal to 
its expected value with all of its negative value realizations replaced by zero.
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C. Real Option Values and Equilibrium Settlement Amounts 
In the LPG model of legal disputes, the parties compare their deterministic cash outflows 
from the costs of litigation with their probability weighted expected monetary payoffs to 
litigation.  If the parties have the same expected values for trial, they will settle rather than go to 
court in order to save on trial costs (even if they are risk-neutral) or because they are risk-averse 
(even if trial costs are zero).  Parties only go to trial if they have sufficiently different beliefs 
over the probability that the plaintiff will prevail at trial and/or the size of the judgment if the 
plaintiff should win at trial.  In the LPG models, different expected values for the outcome of 
trial are necessary, but not sufficient for trial.247  Settlement occurs if and only if there is a range 
of mutually acceptable settlement amounts.  This interval will be non-empty if and only if the 
difference between the plaintiff's expected gain and the defendant's expected loss from going to 
trial is less than the sum of their litigation costs.  The parties will settle immediately at an amount 
in the range of mutually acceptable settlement amounts.  The precise settlement amount in that 
range is determined by the values of the parties’ relative bargaining strengths.  A similar 
immediate settlement result holds true in this real abandonment options model of lawsuits, the 
difference being the value of the settlement amount.248
Proposition 3: If the parties to litigation share the same initial common probability beliefs {pt} 
and have common knowledge over {Jt}, {It} and {Ct}, then both parties will agree to settle the 
litigation in period 1 for the Nash equilibrium amount S* = OV1(s1)  E1(s1).
Proof: If the litigants share common priors regarding the distributions of the relevant random 
variables, then they also will agree on the values of OV1(st) and E1(It) and the inequality 
247 See, e.g. MICELI, supra note 79, at 157-58 for an exposition of the differing perceptions model. 
248 See also, Cornell, supra note 85, at 180-81.
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conditions in Proposition 1 being satisfied for all t  n.  Thus, they will agree to settle 
immediately to avoid incurring litigation costs.  In other words, the defendant will effectively 
agree to buy the plaintiff's initial abandonment option for its value OV1(s1) which is at least as 
large as the net present discounted expected value of the lawsuit, E1(s1). 
In this real options game-theoretic model, all lawsuits are settled immediately in the case 
of homogeneous probability beliefs {pt} between the plaintiff and defendant and common 
knowledge regarding the distributions of {Jt}, {It} and {Ct}.  As with settlement in the LPG 
model, the settlement amount in this real options model is constructed iteratively period by 
period from the last period backwards.  If a lawsuit were to be credibly filed and not settled 
immediately due to differing beliefs {pt} or lack of common knowledge over the distributions of 
{Jt}, {It} and {Ct}, it might settle nonetheless at some later period, e.g., after discovery, due to 
convergence of probability beliefs {pt} or common knowledge about {Jt}, {It} and {Ct}.  In 
particular, optimism or self-serving biases can generate lack of immediate settlement, as is the 
case in the LPG model.249  Finally, notice that higher than expected actual realized litigation 
costs may cause a plaintiff to unilaterally drop her lawsuit (because the premium of the 
abandonment option at that stage is greater than its value). 
D. Qualitative Comparative Statics or Sensitivity Analysis
A real options game-theoretic model of lawsuits has different implications for how 
various policies or shifts in the underlying legal random variables change the incentives to file 
lawsuits and the size of Nash equilibrium settlement amounts than those that are predicted by 
expected value game-theoretic model of lawsuits.  Economists utilize the phrase comparative 
249
 Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 109, 111-16 (1997).
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statics analysis to refer to a comparison of how equilibrium behavior differs for different 
parameter values.250  Another way to think of a comparative statics result is that it analyzes how 
sensitive behavior endogenously determined in equilibrium is to changes in exogenous variables.  
Thus, comparative statics results are forms of sensitivity analysis.  In the litigation abandonment 
real options model, many of these comparative statics results are driven by the fact that the 
option value of a random variable increases with its variance because of the option to avoid 
downside risk, while a random variable’s expected value does not necessarily increase with its 
variance.  
The first comparative statics result concerns the awarding of punitive damages, a practice 
in certain areas of the law such as treble damages in antitrust,251 punitive multiples in certain tort 
actions,252 or willful contract breach.253  Punitive damages increase the incentive to file lawsuits 
because such damages increase the amount of expected judgments.  But, above and beyond the 
mean-increasing effect on judgments, punitive damages also increase the variance of judgments 
and hence they not only increase the net present discounted values, but also the real 
abandonment option values, of settlement. 
Proposition 4: Holding all other variables fixed, punitive damages increase the incentives to file 
lawsuits and equilibrium settlement amounts more that just a variance-preserving increase in 
judgments by the same factor as the punitive multiple does.
250 See, e.g., ALPHA C. CHIANG, FUNDAMENTAL METHODS OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 127-28 (3d ed. 1984) 
(explaining the method of comparative statics); LIONEL W. MCKENSZIE, CLASSICAL GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM 
THEORY 133-64 (2002) (presenting a detailed and rigorous treatment of comparative statics); and PAUL A. 
SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 20 (enlarged ed 1983) (defining comparative statics).
251 Clayton Act, ch. 323, §4(a), 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
252 See, e.g., Milwaukee and St. Paul R.R. Co. v. Arms et al., 91 U.S. 489, 492 (1875) (holding that punitive 
damages were “too well-settled now to be shaken, that exemplary damages may in certain cases be assessed.”).
253 See generally, A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 869 (1998) and CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE (2002).  See also, John E. 
Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 
994-97 (1984); Richard Craswell, Damage Multipliers in Market Relationships, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 463 (1996); and 
Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Principle and Its Alternatives, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2185 
(1999); and Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
279, 292-97 (1986).
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Proof: All other things being equal, punitive damages increase the variance of xt for all t and thus 
increase OV1(st) for all t.   Thus, the necessary and sufficient conditions for filing lawsuits are 
more likely to hold than before and compared to merely a variance-preserving increase in 
judgments by the same factor as the punitive multiple. 
The other side of the above result concerns the frequently suggested policy of capping the 
damages which juries can award.  Although these proposals usually lament both the 
unpredictability and seemingly random nature of jury awards, the argument behind these reforms 
focuses on the absolute magnitude of the punitive component of jury awards.  A real 
abandonment options model of lawsuits makes clear that not only the size of expected punitive 
damages, but also the variance of punitive damages affects the incentives to sue and settle.  This 
is because above and beyond the mean-decreasing effect on judgments, damage caps also 
decrease the variance of judgments and hence they not only decrease the net present values, but 
also the real abandonment option values of settlement.
Proposition 5: Holding all other variables fixed, damage caps decrease the incentives to file 
lawsuits and equilibrium settlement amounts more that just a variance-preserving decrease in 
judgments by the same factor as the punitive multiple does.
Proof: All other things being equal, damage caps decrease the variance of xt for all t and thus 
decrease OV1(st) for all t.  Thus, the necessary and sufficient conditions for filing lawsuits are 
less likely to hold than before and compared to merely a variance-preserving decrease in 
judgments by the same factor as the punitive multiple. 
The above two results concerning effects on incentives to file lawsuits of substantive or 
procedural reforms are special cases of the next general comparative statics result about how the 
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real abandonment option value of a lawsuit changes as the variance of the trial judgment award 
changes.  
Proposition 6: Holding all other variables fixed, an increase (respectively, decrease) in the 
variance of the trial judgment award increases (respectively, decreases) the incentives to file 
lawsuits and equilibrium settlement amounts.  
Proof: All other things being equal, higher (respectively, lower) variance in the trial judgment 
award increases (respectively, decreases) OV1(st) for all t.  Thus, the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for filing a lawsuit are more (respectively, less) likely to hold than before. 
The next proposition explains how the option value of a lawsuit changes as the variance 
of the defendant's litigation costs changes, all other things being equal.  More (respectively, less) 
risk over the defendant’s legal costs at any given stage increases (respectively, decreases) a 
plaintiff’s incentive to file a lawsuit because of the increased (respectively, decreased) savings in 
defendant’s avoided legal costs from settling before that stage.  
Proposition 7: Holding all other variables fixed, increasing (respectively, decreasing) the 
variance of defendant's litigation costs at any stage k  n, increases (respectively, decreases) the 
incentives to file lawsuits and equilibrium settlement amounts.  
Proof: Holding all other variables fixed, more (respectively, less) variance in the defendant's 
litigation costs at stage k  n increases (respectively, decreases) OV1(st) for all t  k.  Thus, the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for filing a lawsuit are more (respectively, less) likely to hold 
than before. 
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Because changing the variance of the plaintiff’s litigation costs also generally changes the 
mean of the plaintiff’s litigation costs; changing the variance of the plaintiff’s litigation costs 
affects both sides of the inequalities from the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
(credible) filing of a lawsuit.  To isolate the impact of changing the variance of the plaintiff’s 
litigation costs upon the option value of lawsuit, the next proposition analyzes how the option 
value of a lawsuit changes as the variance of plaintiff’s litigation costs changes in a mean-
preserving manner.
Proposition 8: Holding all other variables fixed, a mean-preserving increase (respectively, 
decrease) in the variance of plaintiff's litigation costs at any stage k  n, increases (respectively, 
decreases) the incentives to file lawsuits and equilibrium settlement amounts.
Proof: All other things being equal, higher (respectively, lower) variance in the plaintiff's 
litigation costs at stage k increases (respectively, decreases) OV1(st) for all t  k.  Thus, the 
necessary and sufficient condition for filing a lawsuit is more likely to hold than before. 
The next proposition analytically demonstrates that initially NEV lawsuits due to non-
negative values of litigation real options generalizes Bebchuk’s model of NEV litigation. 
Proposition 9: The set of parameter values for which initially NEV lawsuits are brought is larger 
than in Bebchuk’s model of NEV litigation.254  The difference between the set of parameter 
values for which NEV lawsuits are filed in a real options model and Bebchuk’s model is a 
function of the difference between OV1(st) and E1(st), which in turn depends on the ability to 
subdivide the litigation into stages and the opportunities to learn more information.
254
 Bebchuk, supra note 94, at 14. 
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Proof: Bebchuk's conditions for the filing of a lawsuit can be thought of as t, E1(st) > It.  
Bebchuk’s model describes the situation of a lawsuit in which the values of all of the variables 
are known with certainty by the litigants.  Under symmetric uncertainty, Bebchuk's conditions 
become E1(st) > E1(It).  Because the lawsuit can be dropped t, OV1(st)  0 and moreover OV1(st) 
 E1(st). Thus, whenever E1(st) > E1(It), OV1(st) > E1(It) also holds.  But, OV1(st) > E1(It) can 
hold even though E1(It) > E1(st). 
Interpreting a comparison between the relative sizes of the set of parameter values in 
Bebchuk’s non-stochastic model that satisfy the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
credible filing of NEV lawsuits with that of the set of parameter values in the stochastic real 
abandonment options model that satisfy the necessary and sufficient conditions for the credible 
filing of NEV lawsuits requires a bit of care.  When any non-stochastic model is embedded in 
another stochastic model involving the same variables as in the non-stochastic model, the whole 
parameter space of the non-stochastic model is only a single point in the parameter space of the 
stochastic model.  In other words, for most economically and legally relevant choices of 
topologies and measures, the entire parameter space of the non-stochastic model will only be a 
small or negligible set in the parameter space of the stochastic model. 255  Thus, any proper subset 
of the parameter space of the non-stochastic model is a fortiori a small and negligible proper 
subset in the parameter space of the stochastic model.  It is thus comes as no surprise that a real 
options model of NEV litigation generalizes Bebchuk’s non-stochastic model of NEV litigation 
255 The precise notion of small depends on how we measure risk.  For example, if risk involves a family of normal 
distributions, the parameter space of the stochastic model is that of the mean and variance of normally distributed 
random variables and the non-stochastic model is described by a point, which is a closed set of measure zero in the 
non-negative quadrant of Euclidean plane.  If the risk involves a family of smooth distributions restricted to have 
finite variance, then a natural parameter space of the stochastic model is the infinite dimensional function space L2
and the non-stochastic model is described by a set consisting of a single point, which is a small or negligible set for 
most economically, legally, and mathematically relevant or appropriate choices of topologies and measures.  For 
technical details, see RALPH ABRAHAM ET AL., MANIFOLDS, TENSOR ANALYSIS, AND APPLICATIONS 2, 399, 551 
(1983) (defining closed set, Lp spaces, and measure zero).
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because any stochastic model generalizes any non-stochastic model involving the same variables 
in the sense that stochastic random variables generalize non-stochastic random variables.  
The next two results analyze the impact of changes in a plaintiff’s litigation costs on that 
plaintiff’s incentive to file litigation and the resulting equilibrium settlement amount.  Increased 
or greater divisibility of a plaintiff’s legal costs only bolstered the credibility of a plaintiff’s 
threats to continue a lawsuit in Bebchuk’s non-stochastic model,256 and Cornell’s non-game-
theoretic model.257  A similar proposition holds in this Article’s game-theoretic stochastic model.
Proposition 10: A finer partition of a plaintiff’s legal costs can only bolster the credibility of that 
plaintiff’s threats to continue a lawsuit and therefore increase equilibrium settlement amounts.
Proof:  Let a finer partition of the plaintiff’s legal costs be formed by at least subdividing some 
stage k into two substages: i and j.  By construction, the plaintiff’s legal costs in stage k can be 
decomposed into two component legal costs in stage i and stage j: Ik = Ii + Ij.  If the plaintiff 
initially had credible threats for continuing the lawsuit through to trial, then by proposition 1, 
option values of settlement at each stage are larger than the initial expected premia of those 
continuation options. In other words, for all t  n; these inequalities hold at date 1: OV1(st) 
E1(It).  In particular, at stage 1 it is expected that at stage k, OV1(sk)  E1(Ik) = E1(Ii) + E1(Ij).  
By definition of the random variables st, sk = si = sj because there is no intermediate bargaining 
between stages k and k+1.   Thus, OV1(si) = OV1(sk)  E1(Ik) > E1(Ii) and OV1(sj) = OV1(sk) 
E1(Ik) > E1(Ij).  By proposition 1, this means that all of the plaintiff’s threats for continuing the 
lawsuit through to trial remain credible.
256
 Bebchuk, supra note 94, at 15 and n.11.  See also, Lucian A. Bebchuk, On Divisibility and Credibility: The 
Effects of the Distribution of Litigation Costs Over Time on the Credibility of Threats to Sue, John M. Olin Center 
for in Law, Economics, and Business Discussion Paper No. 190, Harvard Law School (August 1996) (unpublished 
manuscript).
257
 Cornell, supra note 85, at 184.
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If the plaintiff initially did not have a credible threat at stage k for continuing the lawsuit 
through to trial, then by proposition 1, OV1(sk) < E1(Ik) = E1(Ii) + E1(Ij).  As noted above, sk = si
= sj because there is no intermediate bargaining between stages k and k+1.  It is now possible 
that both OV1(sk)  E1(Ii) and OV1(sk)  E1(Ij).  Of course, that is not guaranteed because it is 
also possible that OV1(sk) < E1(Ii) yet OV1(sk)  E1(Ij or OV1(sk)  E1(Ii) yet OV1(sk) < E1(Ij) 
or OV1(sk) < E1(Ii) and OV1(sk) < E1(Ij).  If any one of these three possibilities holds, then the 
plaintiff is initially expected not to have a credible threat at stage i or j or both for continuing the 
lawsuit through to trial. 
In Cornell’s non-game-theoretic model, front-loading a plaintiff’s legal costs, meaning 
increasing that plaintiff’s expected litigation costs at earlier stages while preserving the 
plaintiff’s total expected litigation costs, reduced that plaintiff’s litigation abandonment option 
value.258 A similar proposition holds in this Article’s game-theoretic stochastic model.
Proposition 11:  Holding all other variables fixed, front-loading a plaintiff’s litigation costs 
decreases the incentives to file lawsuits and equilibrium settlement amounts.
Proof: All other things being fixed, front-loading a plaintiff’s litigation costs increases E1(It) for 
initial values of t = 1, 2, ….  Thus, the necessary and sufficient conditions for initially filing 
lawsuits are less likely to hold than before. 
Conversely, back-loading a plaintiff’s legal costs, meaning decreasing that plaintiff’s 
expected litigation costs at earlier stages while preserving the plaintiff’s total expected litigation 
costs, increases that plaintiff’s litigation abandonment option value.
258
 Blanton, supra note 86, at 161, 186.
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Proposition 12:  Holding all other variables fixed, back-loading a plaintiff’s litigation costs 
increases the incentives to file lawsuits and equilibrium settlement amounts even preserving the 
plaintiff’s total expected litigation costs.
Proof: All other things being held equal, back-loading a plaintiff’s litigation costs decreases 
E1(It) for initial values of t = 1, 2, ….  Thus, the necessary and sufficient conditions for initially 
filing lawsuits are more likely to hold than before. 
In Cornell’s non-game-theoretic model, increasing a plaintiff’s total legal costs reduced 
that plaintiff’s litigation abandonment option value.259 A similar proposition holds in this 
Article’s game-theoretic stochastic model.
Proposition 13:  Holding all other variables fixed, increasing a plaintiff’s total expected litigation 
costs decreases that plaintiff’s incentives to file lawsuits and equilibrium settlement amount.
Proof: All other things being held fixed, increasing a plaintiff’s total expected litigation costs 
increases E1(It) for some value(s) of t.  Thus, at least one of the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for initially filing lawsuits is less likely to hold than before. 
Conversely, decreasing a plaintiff’s total legal costs increases that plaintiff’s litigation 
abandonment option value.
Proposition 14:  Holding all other variables fixed, decreasing a plaintiff’s total expected litigation 
costs increases that plaintiff’s incentives to file lawsuits and equilibrium settlement amount.
259 Id.
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Proof: All other things being equal, decreasing a plaintiff’s total expected litigation costs 
decreases E1(It) for some value(s) of t.  Thus, at least one of the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for initially filing lawsuits is more likely to hold than before. 
